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The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause
Randy E. Barnett-I
The U& Supreme Court, in recent cases; has attempted to define limits on fie Congress's
power to regulate commerce anong the several states While Justice Thomas has maintained that
the original meaning of "commerce" was limited to the "trade and exdange" of goods and trans.
portation for this purpose, some have argued that he is mistaken and that "commerce" originally
included any "gainful activity." Having examined ever), appearance of the word -conmnerce"in the
records of the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debawem and the Federalist Paper- Pro-
fessor Barnett finds no surviving example of this term being used in this broader sense. In every
appearance where the context suggests a specific usage, the narrol meaning is alvays employed.
Moreover, originalist evidence of the meaning of "among the several States" and "To regulate"also
supports a narrow reading of the Commerce Clause- "Among the several States" meant between
persons of one state and another, and "To regulate" generally meant "to make regular"-tat L to
specify how an activity may be transacted-when applied to domestic commerce, but when applied
to foreign trade also included the power to make "prohibitory regulation&" In sun, according to
the original meaning of the Commerce Clause, Congress has power to specify rules to govern the
manner by which people may exchange or trade goods front one state to another, to remove ob-
structions to domestic trade erected by state; and to both regulate and restrict the flo, of goods to
and from other nations (and the Indian tribes) for the purpose of promoting tie domestic econ-
omy and foreign trade.
In United States v Lopez, for the first time in sixty years, the Su-
preme Court of the United States held a statute to be unconstitutional
because it exceeded the powers of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas offered a critique of
contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine-based on the original
meaning of the clause-that went well beyond the majority opinion.
According to Justice Thomas, "[a]t the time the original Constitution
was ratified, 'commerce' consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as
well as transporting for these purposes."' He also cited the etymology
of the word, which literally means "with merchandise."' He then noted
I Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law (<rbamettGbu.edu>). I
wish to thank Richard Epstein, Olivier Moreteau. David Snyder, Nancy Staudt, my colleagues
Jack Beermann, Oona Hathaway, Steve Marks, Mike Meurer, and especially Susan Koniak for
their extraordinarily helpful comments and suggestions.
1 514 US 549 (1995).
2 Id at 552.
3 Id at 585. Justice Thomas cited: Samuel Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language
361 (W. Strahan 4th ed 1773) (defining commerce as "Intercour[s]e; exchange of one thing for
another, interchange of any thing; trade; traffick"); Nathan Bailey An Universal Etymological
English Dictionary (Neill 26th ed 1789) ("trade or traffic");T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary
of the English Language 585-86 (W. Young, Mills and Son 6th ed 1796) ("Exchange of one thing
for another, trade, traffick").
4 Justice Thomas relied on the Oxford English Dictionary for the etymology of the word
"commerce." 514 US at 585-86. See 3 Oxford English Dictionary 552 (2d ed 1989) (com--with";
merci-"merchandise").
HeinOnline -- 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101 2001
The University of Chicago Law Review
that "when Federalists and Anti-Federalists discussed the Commerce
Clause during the ratification period, they often used trade (in its sell-
ing/bartering sense) and commerce interchangeably."' The term
"commerce," according to Justice Thomas, "was used in contradistinc-
tion to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture." 6
In his opinion, Justice Thomas endorsed the view of the meaning
of "commerce" that the Supreme Court of the Progressive Era used to
strike down various regulations of economic activity.7 In cases such as
United States v E.C. Knight Co,8 the Court distinguished "commerce"
from manufacturing or agriculture, and held that the regulation of ei-
ther manufacturing or agriculture exceeded the powers of Congress
under the clause.9
Referring to "what legal historians with proper derision call 'law
office history,"' Judge Richard Posner cited Justice Thomas's concur-
rence as an example of "highly debatable historical excursus by
originalist judges."'° Justice Thomas's conception of the original mean-
ing of the Commerce Clause has also been challenged in a lengthy ar-
ticle by Professors Grant Nelson and Robert Pushaw, Jr." They exam-
ine "the original meaning, intent, and understanding"'2 of the Com-
merce Clause and reach the conclusion that commerce originally re-
ferred to any "gainful activity."'' 3 As such it would embrace all manu-
facturing and agriculture in addition to trade and exchange.
5 514 US at 586. Thomas cited: Federalist 4 (Jay), in Jacob E. Cooke, ed, The Federalist Pa-
pers 22 (Wesleyan 1961) (asserting that countries will cultivate our friendship when our "trade"
is prudently regulated by the federal government); Federalist 7 (Hamilton), in Cooke, ed, The
Federalist Papers at 39-40 (discussing "competitions of commerce" between states resulting from
state "regulations of trade"); Federalist 40 (Madison), in Cooke, ed, The Federalist Papers at 262
(asserting that it was an "acknowledged object of the Convention... that the regulation of trade
should be submitted to the general government"); Richard Henry Lee, Letters of a Federal
Farmer No. 5, in Paul Leicester Ford, ed, Pamphlets on the Constitution of the United States 1787-
88 318,319 (1888); Melancton Smith, An Address to the People of the State of New-York, in Ford,
ed, Pamphlets on the Constitution 88,107.
6 514 US at 586-87. Thomas cited in support of this Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist
Papers and two instances of such usage in the ratification conventions.
7 Id at 599 ("If anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's dramatic departure in the 1930's
from a century and a half of precedent.").
8 156 US 1 (1895).
9 Id at 12 ("Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.").
10 Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudica-
tion and Legal Scholarship, 67 U Chi L Rev 573,595 & n 56 (2000).
11 Grant S. Nelson and Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying
First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control over Social
Issues, 85 Iowa L Rev 1 (1999).
12 Id at 13.
13 Id at 13-20.
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In their article, Nelson and Pushaw rely "heavily"" upon the two
earlier works of scholarship that had challenged the Progressive Era
Court's limited conception of commerce: The Power to Govern by
Walton Hamilton and Douglass Adair," and Politics and the Constitu-
tion in the History of the United States by William Crosskey." Though
recognizing the many well-documented deficiencies in Crosskey's
work, they state their agreement "with those scholars who have found
Crosskey's evidence persuasive in establishing the meaning of 'com-
merce,' but not his other claims (such as the supposed creation of a
national government with complete legislative authority).'
Nelson and Pushaw chide other modern scholars, such as Albert
Abel,"' Richard Epstein,"' and Raoul Berger,-" who have endorsed the
narrow view-as well as Justice Thomas for relying upon them-for
ignoring the "massive eighteenth-century linguistic and historical evi-
dence demonstrating that the Commerce Clause had a far broader
scope,"2' claiming that "the ThomaslEpstein/Berger approach is his-
torically unsound.'" They contend that "[t]he argument that the origi-
nal meaning of 'to regulate commerce' was 'to govern all gainful activ-
ity' has never been refuted, and our independent research has cor-
roborated it.'' '
Now that in United States v Morrison' the Court has found an-
other statute to be unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, -, it appears that the Court is seri-
14 Id at 13 n 50 ("Our historical analysis depends heavily upon two secondary sources.").
15 Walton H. Hamilton and Douglass Adair. The Power to Govern: The Constitution- Then
and Now (W.W. Norton 1937).
16 \William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States (Chicago 1953).
17 Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 14 n 50 (cited in note 11).
18 See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Con-
temporary Conunent, 25 MImn L Rev 432,432 (1941) (evaluating materials from 1787 to 1788 to
"discover what import was original to the clause").
19 Specifically, they criticize Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power,
73 Va L Rev 1387,1388 (1987) (analyzing the structure of the federal government, the text of the
Constitution, and other documentation to interpret the Commerce Clause, and coming to the
conclusion that "the expansive construction of the clause by the New Deal Supreme Court is
wrong").
20 See Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause,74 Tex L Rev 695,703
(1996) (arguing that "commerce" as originally understood covered only "the interchange of
goods by one state with another").
21 Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 6 (cited in note 11). See also id at 101 ('Thomas,
Berger, and Epstein do not even cite-much less refute-the massive evidence of this broader
meaning.").
22 Id at 6.
23 Id at 14n50.
24 120 S Ct 1740 (2000).
25 Id at 1754 (holding that portions of the Violence Against Women Act unconstitutionally
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ous about finding some limit on the power to regulate commerce
among the states. It is, therefore, well worth considering whether the
narrow view of the Commerce Clause held by the Progressive Era Su-
preme Court, by Justice Thomas, as well as by Albert Abel, Richard
Epstein, and Raoul Berger is as "historically unsound" as Nelson and
Pushaw contend.
While I agree with much in Nelson and Pushaw's nuanced arti-
cle,6 I will present evidence here that strongly indicates that they,
Crosskey, and Hamilton and Adair are wrong with respect to the
original meaning of the term "commerce" in the Commerce Clause.
Indeed, when I first read Hamilton and Adair and Crosskey, alongside
Nelson and Pushaw's endorsement of their work, I too was persuaded
that "commerce" meant any "gainful activity"-until I had a chance to
survey the records of the Constitutional Convention and the ratifica-
tion debates for myself. When I did, I found to my surprise that the
term "commerce" was consistently used in the narrow sense and that
there is no surviving example of it being used in either source in any
broader sense. The same holds true for the use of the word "com-
merce" in The Federalist Papers.
Upon discovering this, I returned to The Power to Govern and no-
ticed for the first time that Hamilton and Adair omitted any reference
to the use of the term "commerce" in the Philadelphia or ratification
conventions, though they offered evidence from these sources for
other claims!' I was not surprised that Crosskey had omitted this evi-
dence since he explicitly signaled his intention to ignore evidence
from the drafting process. "The samples of word-usage and juristic and
political discussion ... will ... all be drawn ... from sources not con-
nected with the Constitution." Only after examining this evidence,
exceeded the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause).
26 In particular, I agree with Nelson and Pushaw that even the broadest original meaning
of the Commerce Clause that can be justified historically is still far narrower than the power the
Supreme Court currently allows Congress to exercise. See Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at
119-72 (cited in note 11). I do not accept, however, all the doctrines they recommend for apply-
ing this broader, but still not limitless, conception of the Commerce Clause to actual cases and
controversies-for example, their view that Congress may regulate any activity that "affects"
commerce between more states than one, or the extreme deference they would give towards a
congressional assessment of these effects. See id at 110-11.
27 For example, Hamilton and Adair use evidence from the ratification conventions to de-
fine the terms "traffic" and "trade." Hamilton and Adair, The Power to Govern at 54 & n 37
(cited in note 15).The authors also use evidence from the ratifying conventions to argue that the
states approved the use of the taxing power to regulate. Id at 121-27.
28 William Winslow Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United
States 5 (Chicago 1953). Crosskey defends this method as follows:
For, by using such materials, a dictionary can be made which will not, it is conceived, be
open to the many natural suspicions that arise from the known or suspected political bias of
speakers and writers on the Constitution. And in consequence of this, it should lead to con-
[68:101
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however, did I discover just how convenient this deliberate omission
was for Crosskey's thesis. Unfortunately, Nelson and Pushaw do not
fill this gap.
After discussing the evidence concerning the meaning of "com-
merce," I will present evidence on the meaning of the terms "among
the states" and "To regulate." Here I am in more agreement with Nel-
son and Pushaw, who seem to endorse a narrower interpretation of
the original meaning of these terms," though I greatly disagree with
their doctrinal implementation-or construction-of these aspects of
the Commerce Clause.
Before attempting any of this, it is necessary to distinguish "origi-
nal meaning" from "original intent" as methods of originalist interpre-
tation. This distinction will assist in understanding why the evidence of
meaning I present here is significant and why it is not undermined fa-
tally by the contrary evidence relied upon by Nelson and Pushaw,
Hamilton and Adair, and Crosskey. And it is also important to distin-
guish interpretation from construction so as to avoid asking too much
of the former, or confusing the former with the latter.
I. ORIGINAL MEANING AND INTERPRETATION
A. Original Meaning vs. Intent
As I have explained elsewhere," "original meaning" refers to the
meaning a reasonable speaker of English would have attached to the
words, phrases, sentences, etc. at the time the particular provision was
adopted. It is originalist because it disregards any change to that
meaning that may have occurred in the intervening years. It is objec-
tive insofar as it looks to the public meaning conveyed by the words
used in the Constitution, rather than to the subjective intentions of its
framers or ratifiers. By contrast, "original intent" refers to the goals,
objectives, or purposes of those who wrote or ratified the text. These
intentions could have been publicly known-or hidden behind a veil
of secrecy.They could and indeed were likely to be in conflict.
In sum, to use what Ronald Dworkin characterizes as a "crucial
distinction,"3' original meaning refers to "what some officials intended
stitutional conclusions having a very high and singular cogency
Id at 5-6.
29 See, for example, Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 42-49 (cited in note 11) ("Al-
though Crosskey's interpretation is defensible, he did not marshall evidence strong enough to
overcome the presumption that the regulation of commerce, like all federal power, dots not ex-
tend to purely internal state affairs.").
30 The argument presented in this section is substantially elaborated and defended in
Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loyola L Rev 611 (1999).
31 Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation" Federal Courts
2001]
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to say in enacting the language they used," whereas original intent re-
fers to "what they intended-or expected or hoped-would be the
consequences of their saying it."'' If publicly known and widely ac-
cepted, these original intentions could have shaped the original mean-
ing of terms and, for this reason, they are not completely immaterial
to an originalist analysis. But, at best, evidence of the framers' and
ratifiers' intentions (as distinct from evidence of how they used the
words they used) is circumstantial evidence of meaning while at worst
it can distract from the words of the document that were actually em-
ployed.
The method to be preferred depends on one's normative ration-
ale for originalism. Those who believe that we must pay attention to
the framers or ratifiers because they were somehow authorized (by
consent or something else) to issue binding commands to the rest of
the population and to their posterity may want, for this reason, to de-
termine the intentions or objectives that lie behind their words. In
contrast, those who believe that the actions of the ratifiers established
a rule of law that is binding if its content is "good enough" to be le-
gitimate 3 would want to use a writing to "lock-in" that meaning and,
once locked in, adhere to it unless and until it is changed in writing. In
short, a commitment to original intention originalism stems from the
legitimacy of the founders as command givers. In contrast, a commit-
ment to original meaning originalism need not be based on this ra-
tionale, but instead may stem from the legitimacy of the original
commands themselves and the fact these commands were made in
writing. A commitment to original meaning is, then, a crucial part of
the commitment to a written constitution.
Original meaning originalism circumscribes the relevance of
various types of historical evidence the way the objective theory of
contract restricts the evidence relevant to determine the meaning of a
written contract. With written constitutions, as with contracts, we want
evidence of what the terms meant in the particular context of the writ-
ten text at issue, whether a provision in the original Constitution or a
later amendment. As Richard Posner has put the matter:
and the Law 115,116 (Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed).
32 Id.
33 By "legitimate" I mean a lawmaking process capable of producing laws that bind the
citizenry in conscience. See Barnett, 45 Loyola L Rev at 636-43 (cited in note 30) (discussing
original meaning and constitutional legitimacy); Randy E. Barnett, Getting Normative. The Role
of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 Const Commen 93, 98-99 (1995). I will
greatly expand upon this analysis in a work-in-progress entitled The Presumption of Liberty:
Natural Rights and the Constitution.
34 I defend the latter justification in Barnett, 45 Loyola L Rev at 636-48 (cited in note 30).
[68:101
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Sophisticated originalists .. do not want to substitute amateurish
inconclusive debates over history for professional but inconclu-
sive debates over policy or values. They want, or at least ought to
want,... a narrowly focused inquiry into precise and answerable
questions of historical meaning of specific words and sentences,
coupled with a list of "canons of construction" that will enable
those historical meanings to be brought to bear on contemporary
issues.-
This should lead us to prefer evidence of usage that is most
closely associated with the measure's drafting and adoption. Where
the chosen words had more than one established meaning, evidence of
usage outside the context of drafting and ratification may mislead us
as to what the particular words of a particular measure meant at the
time of its enactment. Far from providing useful "context," such his-
torical evidence may instead cloud what was otherwise a fairly clear
meaning. The same is true of "contextual" evidence of the conflicting
objectives or intentions of various actors. What is ultimately important
is not what the framers or ratifiers intended to accomplish but what
they succeeded in adopting and conveying to the public.
With original meaning, then, more "historical context" is not
automatically preferred. To the contrary, originalism requires a limited
focus on certain types of evidence of historical meaning: that evidence
that most clearly indicates the public meaning of the text that is being
interpreted at the time it was adopted. When it comes to determining
original usage, dictionary definitions provide a useful start, but we
must also immediately examine any clues to meaning provided in the
document itself since any context it provides would directly influence
the specific meaning perceived by the public when reading this text.
After all, the document was far more accessible to the general public
than any particular discussion of it. And it is the document that was
adopted as law, not the statements of people about the document.
Where the document itself does not settle the matter, extrinsic
evidence of how persons used words when discussing the particular
text at issue will further narrow the scope of possible meanings. 5 And
35 Posner, 67 U Chi L Rev at 595 (cited in note 10).Why Judge Posner does not think Jus-
tice Thomas's concurrence in Lopez fits this description of originalism is not clear to me and
Posner does not attempt to explain his characterization. But if it truly is -law office history,"
though I disagree, then Justice Thomas happened to hit upon a conclusion that is well justified by
the type of originalist inquiry that Posner seems to endorse.
36 We are confronted here with a "parol evidence rule"-type problem. How can we bz sure
what the meaning of a passage was unless we examine extrinsic evidence to determine the range
of possible meanings it might have had? This is a good reason to consult evidence of usage found
in dictionaries or in the drafting and ratification conventions. But once e%idence of alternative
possibilities is thereby revealed, we must then return to the text to see if the context it provides
2001]
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the more closely in time these discussions are to the document's adop-
tion, the less likely is the chance either that the meaning of words has
changed, or the speaker is seeking to deviate from the original mean-
ing of the text. Thus, evidence of usage in the Philadelphia and state
ratification conventions illuminates the original meaning of the text,
provided that this usage is not shown to be secret or unknown to the
general public.
Of course, where evidence of meaning closely linked to drafting
and ratification is missing or inadequate, we may need to cast a wider
net. In addition, evidence removed from the immediate process of
drafting and ratification can confirm our evaluation of more relevant
evidence or provoke us to take a closer look at what we thought was
clear evidence of original meaning. But it would be improper to let
conflicting evidence either before or after drafting and ratification in
any way trump evidence of a clear public meaning that existed during
this process.
B. Interpretation vs. Construction
It is important to keep in mind that originalism is warranted as a
theory of interpretation-that is, as a method of determining the
meaning of the words written in the Constitution. For better or worse,
knowing the meaning of these words only takes us so far in resolving
current cases and controversies. Due either to ambiguity or vagueness,
the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique
rule of law to be applied to a particular case or controversy. While not
indeterminate, the original meaning can be "underdeterminate."" In-
deed, because the framers frequently used abstract language, this will
often be the case. When this happens, interpretation must be supple-
mented by constitutional construction-within the bounds established
by original meaning. In this manner, construction fills the unavoidable
gaps in constitutional meaning when interpretation has reached its
limits.
Keith Whittington distinguishes interpretation from construction
in the following manner:
Constitutional interpretation is essentially legalistic, but constitu-
tional construction is essentially political. Its precondition is that
parts of the constitutional text have no discoverable meaning. Al-
excludes some of these possibilities or affirms others. If so, then the extrinsic evidence cannot be
used to contradict the text. If not, extrinsic evidence may be used to clarify otherwise ambiguous
passages, provided it is evidence of the contemporary meaning of the text being interpreted.
37 See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U
Chi L Rev 462,473 (1987) (distinguishing between indeterminacy and underdeterminacy).
[68:101
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though the clauses and structures that make up the text cannot
be simply empty of meaning, for they are clearly recognizable as
language, the meaning that they do convey may be so broad and
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal
rules .... Regardless of the extent of judicial interpretation of cer-
tain aspects of the Constitution, there will remain an impenetra-
ble sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered. The ju-
diciary may be able to delimit textual meaning, hedging in the
possibilities, but after all judgments have been rendered specify-
ing discoverable meaning, major indeterminacies may remain.
The specification of a single governing meaning from these pos-
sibilities requires an act of creativity beyond interpretation....
This additional step is the construction of meaning.
He then offers a very long list of constitutional constructions adopted
either by courts in their opinions or by the other branches of govern-
ment in legislation or executive orders that fill the gaps in the original
meaning of the text and help "transform constitutional theory into
constitutional practice."''
Though the process of constitutional construction fills the gaps
within original meaning, I do not share Whittington's characterization
of the process of construction as "political," insofar as this term im-
plies that construction is necessarily and always political. Use of that
phrase also connotes a completely open-ended choice unguided by
constitutional principle. That is not, I think, even Whittington's con-
ception of constitutional construction. Rather, there is often a gap be-
tween abstract or general principles of the kind found in the Constitu-
tion and the rules of law that are needed to put these principles into
38 Keith E.Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and
Judicial Review 7 (Kansas 1999). See also Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Di-
vided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 1-19 (Harvard 1999) (discussing interpretation and
construction, and arguing that construction is necessary because constitutional interpretation
cannot answer every constitutional question).
39 Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 8, 12 (cited in note 38). Whittington groups
constructions into seven categories and I shall just give one example of each (without comment-
ing on whether I think it is warranted): (1) organic structures-specification of the size of the
Supreme Court; (2) delegation and distribution of political powers-judicial refusal to issue ad-
visory opinions; (3) individual and collective rights-no right to secession: (4) structures of po-
litical participationlcitizenship-specification of a single date for national elections; (5) jurisdic-
tion-state annexation through treaty; (6) domestic government role-national bankruptcy law-
and (7) international posture-entrance into NATO. Each of these actions by one or more
branches of the government fleshes out how the government is "constituted" in ways that are not
specified in the written Constitution. For the entire list of Whittington's examples, see id at 12.
Note that in several instances he lists constructions that oppose each other, for example,-federal
incorporation of banks" and "no federal incorporation of banks." Id.
:2001]
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action. '0 This does not mean, however, that the choice of rules is un-
guided by the abstract or general principles that can be ascertained by
interpretation.
Many parts of the Constitution are rule-like and can often be ap-
plied directly to cases without need of intermediate doctrine.1 Other
provisions are abstract and general and require some choice among
possible ways of putting them into effect. ' Still other provisions ex-
plicitly refer to standards or principles that lie outside the text and
therefore authorize supplementation of the text by other materials. 
4
When, for these reasons, the terms of the Constitution cannot directly
be applied to resolve a particular dispute, some construction, as op-
posed to interpretation, of constitutional meaning is required. As
Whittington observes, constructions operate "where the text is so
broad or so underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful but ex-
haustive reduction to legal rules.""
Constitutional constructions, then, are not wholly "political." The
choices among possible constructions, while not dictated by original
meaning interpretation, can be and often are limited by that meaning.
In this way, constitutional constructions, though not identical with the
text nor deduced immediately from it, are not unconnected or uncon-
strained by the text. The text provides what Frederick Schauer has
called a "frame" that excludes many constructions without determin-
ing one unique construction that would put into action the general
principles it enunciates. "The language of a [constitutional] clause,
whether seemingly general or seemingly specific, establishes a bound-
ary, or a frame, albeit a frame with fuzzy edges. Even though the lan-
guage itself does not tell us what goes on within the frame, it does tell
us when we have gone outside it.' Therefore, though by definition
constructions are not in the Constitution, they can be of the Constitu-
tion.
Apart from revealing the limits of interpretation, the distinction
between interpretation and construction also helps us to understand
the differing appeals of original meaning and original intent original-
ism. The former looks to original usage to determine the meaning of
40 See Randy E. Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law 108-31 (Ox-
ford 1998) (explaining why conventional rules of law are needed to put abstract and underde-
terminate principles of justice into effect).
41 The oft-cited example is the Presidential age limit of thirty-five years in US Const Art II,
§ 1,c15.
42 See, for example, the phrase "cruel and unusual" in US Const Amend VIII.
43 Consider the Ninth Amendment's reference to unspecified "other[ I" rights "retained by
the people." US Const Amend IX.
44 Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 5 (cited in note 38).
45 Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S Cal L Rev 399,430 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
[68:101
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the text, though this meaning may require construction due to ambi-
guity and vagueness. So long as we stay within the frame provided by
the original meaning of the text, our choice of specific rules to decide
cases may be influenced by other considerations, such as justice or
precedent, depending on what it is we think makes a constitution
binding.
Some originalists, however, seek to go beyond the original mean-
ing of the text to identify the specific constructions that would have
been preferred or intended by the framers or ratifiers. Often this is
done by "channeling the framers," that is, by hypothesizing what the
framers would have intended had they been presented with the case at
hand. I do not think that the normative case for original meaning
originalism entails a commitment to construction according to the
original intentions of the framers or ratifiers " This is not to deny that
some of the founders might usefully be consulted to determine a con-
struction that best fits the underlying principles of the constitution
they wrote and approved. In this manner, the framers as the designers
of the Constitution become our teachers rather than our wardens."
There is then an important distinction between determining the
original meaning of text and construing that meaning, where it is
vague or ambiguous, according to the original intentions of its drafters
or ratifiers. In what follows, I present what I think is the best evidence
of the original meaning of the Commerce Clause. How that meaning,
once established, is to be construed is a different matter that I may
touch upon in passing, but is not the primary focus of this Article.
II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF "COMMERCE"
The Commerce Clause raises three questions that must be an-
swered by interpretation, construction, or both: What is the meaning
of "Commerce"? What is the meaning of "among the several States"?
And what is the meaning of "To regulate"? The source of the scholarly
debate lies in the fact that, unlike some other provisions of the Consti-
tution, the evidence of "original intent, meaning, and understanding"'"
is in conflict. This is because there was a clash of objectives among dif-
ferent supporters of the Constitution, not to mention a clash between
supporters and opponents. And unlike other passages of the Constitu-
tion, each of the terms of the Commerce Power is said to have had, at
46 See Barnett, 45 Loyola L Rev at 611-14 (cited in note 30) (discussing the significant
problems with "original intent" originalism while suggesting that the new originalism has "%irtu-
ally triumphed over other interpretive techniques").
47 See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers' Intent, 19 Han' J L & Pub Pol 403,
403 (1996) (distinguishing between the "framers as wardens" and the -framers as designers").
48 Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 13 (cited in note 11).
2001]
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the time of the founding, both an expansive and more limited meaning
in common discourse (though not, as we shall see, in the context of the
drafting and ratifying of the Constitution).
"Commerce" might be limited to trade or exchange of goods,
which would exclude, for example, agriculture, manufacturing, and
other methods of production, or it might expansively be interpreted to
refer to any gainful activity. "To regulate" might be limited to "make
regular," which would subject a particular type of commerce to a rule
and would exclude, for example, any prohibition on trade as an end in
itself, or it might expansively be interpreted to mean "to govern,"
which would include prohibitions as well as pure regulations.
"[A]mong the several States" might be limited to commerce that takes
place between the states (or between people of different states), as op-
posed to commerce that occurs between persons of the same state. Or
"among the states" might expansively be interpreted to refer to com-
merce "among the people of the States," whether such commerce oc-
curs between people in the same state or in different states.
Though it is often difficult to be sure of the meaning intended by
a speaker from the context of a particular statement, there are good
textual and contextual reasons to accept the narrower definition of
each of these terms as their original meaning at the time of the found-
ing. Because the meaning of the term "commerce" has been the most
contentious, I will spend more time evaluating the evidence of its
original meaning than that of the others.
I was surprised to find, given the degree of scholarly criticism of
the narrow meaning, that the use of the term "commerce" in the draft-
ing and ratification process was remarkably uniform. Indeed, I have
found not a single example from the reports of these proceedings that
unambiguously used the broad meaning of "commerce" and many in-
stances where the context makes clear that the speaker intended a
narrow meaning.
A. Originalist Sources
1. The text.
The first place to look for the original meaning of the text is the
text itself, both the immediate text at issue and any other text in the
Constitution that may shed light on the meaning of the relevant por-
tion. In sum, does the Constitution serve as its own dictionary on the
meaning of a particular word? When considering the meaning of the
term "commerce," it is tempting to argue that "commerce" must mean
trade, and not manufacturing or agriculture, because it would make no
sense to refer to a congressional power "to regulate manufacturing
with foreign nations" or "to regulate agriculture with Indian tribes."
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This temptation should be resisted, however. For, if we plug the
broadest meaning of "commerce"-that is, "gainful activity"-into the
sentence so it reads Congress shall have power "to regulate gainful ac-
tivity with foreign nations," the sentence makes perfect sense. While it
is true that the clause would be referring only to that subset of gainful
activity that can be conducted "with foreign nations" and "with the
Indian tribes" and that this would exclude manufacturing and agricul-
ture, this would not be due to any narrow meaning of "commerce," but
because of the narrowing meaning of "with foreign nations" and "with
Indian tribes." In other words, the word "commerce" could still be
used in its broadest sense in a manner that does justice to the sentence
as a whole. Therefore, while this sort of textual analysis may well re-
veal what the term "among the several States" means," it does not tell
us in which sense, narrow or broad, the word "commerce" is being
used in the Commerce Clause, and we must look elsewhere for guid-
ance.
A bit more assistance is provided from the way "commerce" is
used in Article I, Section 9, which reads: "No Preference shall be given
by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State
over those of another. . . ?' Here, as Richard Epstein has written,
"[t]he term 'commerce' is used in opposition to the term 'revenue,'
and seems clearly to refer to shipping and its incidental activities; this
much seems evident from the use of the term 'port.'" Moreover,
unlike the Commerce Clause, we cannot here comfortably substitute
"gainful activity" for the term "commerce." "No Preference shall be
given by any Regulation of gainful activity to the Ports of one State
over those of another" is too awkward to be an accurate translation.
But though in Article I, Section 9, the term "commerce" is, all by it-
selfC pretty clearly being used in a much narrower sense than "any
gainful activity," we cannot be sure from this usage exactly what this
sense is. For that we need to appeal to extrinsic evidence of original
meaning that lies outside the four corners of the Constitution.
2. Contemporary dictionaries.
Commerce is defined in the 1785 edition of Samuel Johnson's
Dictionary of the English Language as "1. Intercourse; exchange of
one thing for another; interchange of any thing; trade; traffick."1 In
49 See Part II.A.
50 US Const Art I, § 9,cl 6.
51 Epstein, 73 Va L Rev at 1395 (cited in note 19).
52 By this I mean the narrowing sense is not provided by some other phrase such as with
foreign Nations."
53 Samuel Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language (J.F Rivington. et al 6th ed
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contrast, "manufacture" is defined as "1. The practice of making any
piece of workmanship. 2. Any thing made by art."' "Agriculture" is de-
fined as "[t]he art of cultivating the ground; tillage; husbandry, as dis-
tinct from pasturage."" If Johnson is accurate, commerce referred pre-
dominantly to exchange or trade as distinct from the agricultural or
manufacturing production of those things that are subsequently
traded. As Justice Thomas noted in his concurrence, Johnson's defini-
tion of "commerce" is borne out by other dictionaries of the time. It is
also the usage most closely associated with the drafting and adoption
of the Constitution.
Nelson and Pushaw acknowledge that "trade and exchange" is
the core meaning of "commerce."'57 The question is whether they are
right to claim that "[a]bundant evidence demonstrates, however, that
'commerce' had other broader meanings, which a significant number
of the Constitution's Framers and Ratifiers intended to incorporate.""
While their evidence showed that a number of framers and ratifiers
may have desired a government powerful enough to control all as-
pects of the national economy, the issue is whether the term "com-
merce" that was chosen to describe the powers of Congress conveyed
that expansive meaning to those to whom it was addressed and
whether the public statements of those who supported the Constitu-
tion and favored broad national powers reflected such a meaning. If
"commerce" had been used in its broad sense, we would expect this
usage to appear somewhere in the records of the Constitution's draft-
ing and ratification. But no such example exists.
3. Constitutional Convention.
In Madison's notes for the Constitutional Convention, the term
"commerce" appears thirty-four times in the speeches of the dele-
gates. 9 Eight of these are unambiguous references to commerce with
foreign nations which can only consist of trade. In every other in-
stance, the terms "trade" or "exchange" could be substituted for the
term "commerce" with the apparent meaning of the statement pre-
1785).
54 Samuel Johnson, 2 A Dictionary of the English Language (J.F. Rivington, et at 6th ed
1785).
55 Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 53).
56 See note 3.
57 See Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 101 n 478 (cited in note 11) ("We readily con-
cede that in the eighteenth century (1) the primary definition of 'commerce' was the one prof-
fered by Thomas, Berger, and Epstein, and (2) some may have thought that this was the meaning
conveyed in the Commerce Clause.").
58 Id.
59 This is apart from the sixteen times in which it appears in quotes from various proposals.
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served. In no instance is the term "commerce" clearly used to refer to
"any gainful activity" or anything broader than trade. One congres-
sional power proposed by Madison, but not ultimately adopted, sug-
gests that the delegates shared the limited meaning of "commerce"
described in Johnson's dictionary. Madison proposed to grant Con-
gress the power "[t]o establish public institutions, rewards, and immu-
nities for the promotion of agriculture, connzerce, trades and manufac-
tures,"'O strongly suggesting that the members understood the term
"commerce" to mean trade or exchange, distinct from the productive
processes that made the things to be traded.
4. The Federalist Papers.
Nor was this a secret usage confined to the Convention. In sev-
eral of his contributions to The Federalist Papers, ardent nationalist
Alexander Hamilton repeatedly made clear the commonplace distinc-
tion between commerce or trade and production. In Federalist 11, he
also explained the purpose of the Commerce Clause, a purpose en-
tirely consistent with the prevailing "core" meaning of the term
"commerce":
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will
advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective
productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home,
but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in
every part will be replenished and will acquire additional motion
and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every
part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from
the diversity in the productions of different Statese'
In Federalist 12, he referred to the "rivalship," now silenced, "be-
tween agriculture and commerce,"' while in Federalist 17, he distin-
guished between the power to regulate such national matters as com-
merce and "the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a
similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be pro-
vided for by local legislation."" In Federalist 21, Hamilton maintained
that causes of the wealth of nations were of "an infinite variety," in-
cluding "[s]ituation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the na-
60 James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 478 (\V.\. Norton
1987) (emphasis added).The term "trades" connotes crafts and other types of trades, not trade or
exchange.
61 Federalist 11 (Hamilton), in Clinton Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers 89 (Penguin
1961).
6 Federalist 12 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed. The Federalist Papers at 91 (cited in note 61).
63 Federalist 17 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 118 (cited in note 61).
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ture of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of infor-
mation they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of industry."'' In
Federalist 35, he asked, "Will not the merchant understand and be
disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the me-
chanic and manufacturing arts to which his commerce is so nearly al-
lied?" 6'
In none of the sixty-three appearances of the term "commerce" in
The Federalist Papers is it ever used to unambiguously refer to any ac-
tivity beyond trade or exchange. At the time of the framing, then, for
Hamilton, a proponent of broad national powers, the term "com-
merce" in the Constitution referred to trade or exchange, not to the
production of items to be traded, and certainly not to all gainful activ-
ity. Even later, with the contentiousness of the Constitution's adoption
behind him, Hamilton's usage did not change. As Secretary of the
Treasury, Hamilton's official opinion to President Washington advo-
cating a broad congressional power to incorporate a national bank re-
peatedly referred to Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as
the power to regulate the "trade between the States."
5. Ratification conventions.
Having examined every use of the term "commerce" that appears
in the reports of the state ratification conventions, I found that the
term was uniformly used to refer to trade or exchange, rather than all
gainful activity. Because people used this word to convey its accus-
tomed meaning, they did not often define it or give contextual clues as
to what they believed the term meant. Yet some of these public
speeches make clear that "commerce" was used as a synonym for
trade or exchange-and did not include agriculture, manufacturing, or
other business-and every speech is consistent with such a meaning
(though I will discuss two statements that can be misinterpreted as
connoting a broader meaning of "commerce"). I shall present this evi-
dence state by state.
In the records of the Massachusetts convention, the word "com-
merce" is used nineteen times-every use consistent with it meaning
trade, mostly foreign trade; and no use clearly indicating a broader
meaning. The most explicit distinction was made by Thomas Dawes, a
prominent revolutionary and legislator, who began his discussion on
64 Federalist 21 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 141 (cited in note 61).
65 Federalist 35 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 216 (cited in note 61).
66 Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to
Establish a Bank (Feb 23,1791), in Harold C. Syrett, et al, eds, 8 The Papers ofAlexander Handl.
ton 97, 100 (Columbia 1965). See also id at 118 (referring to "the regulation of trade between the
states").
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the importance of the national taxation powers. "We have suffered,"
said he, "for want of such authority in the federal head. This will be
evident if we take a short view of our agriculture, commerce, and
manufactures." He then expounded at some length, giving separate
attention to each of these activities and the beneficial effect the Con-
stitution would have on them." Under the heading of "commerce," he
referred to "our own domestic traffic that passes from state to state."'
Only two other speakers in the Massachusetts convention implic-
itly distinguished between "commerce" and other economic activities.
Charles Turner referred to "the deplorable state of our navigation and
commerce, and various branches of business thereon dependent."'9
And making much the same point, James Bowdoin of Boston argued
that the existing confederation lacked the power to retaliate against
foreign nations who placed restrictions on American exports:
Hence a decrease of our commerce and navigation, and the du-
ties and revenue arising from them. Hence an insufficient de-
mand for the produce of our lands, and the consequent discour-
agement of agriculture. Hence the inability to pay debts, and par-
ticularly taxes, which by that decrease are enhanced. And hence,
as the necessary result of all these, the emigration of our inhabi-
tants.7'
While each of these further consequences flowed from a decrease of
"our commerce and navigation," they were not the same thing as com-
merce.
In the few fragments that survive of the Maryland, Connecticut,
and New Hampshire ratification debates, the term "commerce" is
mentioned only once. In the opening address to the Connecticut con-
vention, Oliver Elsworth referred to the Swiss who "[t]ill lately," he
said, "had neither commerce nor manufactures. They were merely a
set of herdsmen." By contrast, in the more extensive records of the
New York convention, the term appears thirty times. Governor Clin-
ton referred to "[t]he situation of [each state's] commerce, its agricul-
ture, and the system of its resources."' Another delegate questioned
the need for the new central government by noting the rapid eco-
67 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 57 (Taylor & Maury 2d ed 1863).
68 Id at 57-59.
69 Id at 58.
70 Id at 170.
71 Id at 83.
72 Id at 188.
73 Id at 261.
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nomic progress: "How [the country's] agriculture, commerce, and
manufactures have been extended and improved!""
The New York delegate who repeatedly made the clearest distinc-
tion between commerce and other economic activity was Alexander
Hamilton. As part of a lengthy speech, he observed: "The Southern
States possess certain staples,-tobacco, rice, indigo, &c.,-which must
be capital objects in treaties of commerce with foreign nations." The
same distinction is implicit in his denial that the regulation of com-
merce was outside the competency of a central government: "What
are the objects of the government? Commerce, taxation, &c. In order
to comprehend the interests of commerce, is it necessary to know how
wheat is raised, and in what proportion it is produced in one district
and in another? By no means.' 6 Later, in defending the power of di-
rect taxation, Hamilton predicted that in its absence, the "general gov-
ernment ... will push imposts [on our commerce] to an extreme."" As
a result, "[o]ur neighbors, not possessed of our advantages for com-
merce and agriculture, will become manufacturers: their property will,
in a great measure, be vested in the commodities of their own produc-
tions; but a small proportion will be in trade or in lands. Thus, on the
gentleman's scheme, they will be almost free from burdens, while we
shall be loaded with them."
Although there is no example in New York of a clear use of
"commerce" in any sense broader than trade or exchange, two state-
ments might mistakenly be so interpreted. In one, Hamilton argued
that "one man can be as fully acquainted with the general state of the
commerce, manufactures, population, production, and common re-
sources of a state, which are the proper objects of federal legislation."'
Although here, as elsewhere, he uses the term "commerce" narrowly,
this passage might be read to indicate that the entire list of activities
fell within the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
states. Taken in context, this would be a misreading. Rather, Hamilton
is contending here, as he did throughout his career and as did many
others, that the advancement of all these economic activities was the
proper goal of national legislation. He is not speaking of the specific
means or powers granted to Congress by the Constitution to pursue
74 Idat336.
75 Id at 237.
76 Id at 255.
77 Id at 369.
78 Id.
79 Id at 265-66.
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these ends, such as the power of taxation and the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations or among the states.
Referring to the same problem of knowledge, antifederalist Mel-
ancton Smith asserted:
To understand the true commercial interests of a country, not only
requires just ideas of the general commerce of the world, but also,
and principally, a knowledge of the productions of your own
country, and their value, what your soil is capable of producing,
the nature of your manufactures, and the capacity of the country
to increase both."
Although this statement employs the term "commercial interests"
broadly, it still uses the narrow conception of "commerce" as distinct
from "productions" and "manufactures" as included among these
"commercial" interests.
Smith's statement is extremely useful because many of the quotes
employed by Crosskey and others as evidence of a broader meaning
actually use the term "commercial," not "commerce." Nelson and
Pushaw repeatedly use the term "commercial" throughout their article
as though it were synonymous with "commerce," and a great many of
the sources on which they rely to establish the broader meaning of
"commerce" actually use the term "commercial" instead.r" While it
seems reasonable at first blush to think that both terms have the same
meaning, the statement by Smith undercuts this assumption by explic-
itly using "commercial interests" to convey a broader meaning than
the term "commerce."'' In sum, the original meaning of the regulatory
80 The same is true of Chancellor Livingston's argument that:
Some gentlemen suppose that, to understand and provide for the general interests of com-
merce and manufactures, our legislators ought to know how all commodities are produced,
from the first principle of vegetation to the last polish of mechanical labor, that they ought
to be minutely acquainted with all the process of all the arts. If this were true, it would be
necessary that a great part of the British House of Commons should be woollen-drapers;
yet we seldom find such characters in that celebrated assembly.
Id at 275.
81 Id at 245 (emphasis added).
82 See, for example, Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 40 n 163 (cited in note 11) (cit-
ing Charles Pinckney's reference at the Constitutional Convention to the five -commercial inter-
ests" of the American states as including staple crops such as "wheat," "tobacco," and -Rice &
Indigo," as well as "fisheries" and "trade" as evidence that he held a broad view of "commerce").
Pinckney's statement can be read as enumerating the different sources throughout the states of
various articles of commerce. In no way does his list comprehend all gainful activities. In addi-
tion, I shall offer examples below showing that, to the contrary
, 
Pinckney publicly used the term
"commerce" in the narrow sense. See text accompanying notes 93-97.
83 Johnson's definition of "commercial" is: "Commercial: adj [from commerce]. Relating to
commerce or traffick." Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 53). The
pairing of "commerce" with "traffick" suggests that both "commerce" and "commercial" are be-
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powers granted to Congress might have been broader had Article I,
Section 8 granted it the power "to regulate the commercial interests of
the States" rather than the power to regulate only "commerce.
''
The term "commerce" appears only eight times in the report of
the Pennsylvania ratification convention. All uses are consistent with
the narrow meaning of "commerce"; none clearly uses a broader
meaning. Only three uses add any context t.o the term, and all are by
James Wilson, a member of the Constitutional Convention and a per-
son who Nelson and Pushaw claim understood the term "'commerce'
as encompassing not merely the buying and selling of goods, but also
antecedent production, labor-and-wage transactions, and related busi-
ness services like insurance."'' Wilson, they say, "used 'commerce' to
describe all gainful activity.':' In the Philadelphia convention, how-
ever, Wilson referred to "the objects of commerce,"s" suggesting items
being traded. Later he asked, "Is it not an important object to extend
our manufactures and our commerce? This cannot be done, unless a
proper security is provided for the regular discharge of contracts. This
security cannot be obtained, unless we give the power of deciding
upon those contracts to the general government."' His most revealing
comment suggesting a strong distinction between "commerce" and
other economic activities was this:
Suppose we reject this system of government; what will be the
consequence? Let the farmer say, he whose produce remains un-
asked for; nor can he find a single market for its consumption,
ing used in the narrow sense.
84 Though the original meaning of "between the States" might still have greatly limited the
scope of this power. See Part III.A.2.
85 Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 19 (cited in note 11).
86 Id at 19 n 74 (citing statements made by Wilson during the 1790s in his lectures on law
delivered at the College of Philadelphia). Unfortunately, their characterizations of these later
quotes are misleading. In two, the intended meaning is not made plain by Wilson, and he may
well have been referring only to trade. In a third, the only one in which Wilson's meaning is clear,
their parenthetical characterizes Wilson as: "remarking that the United States had 'extensive
prospects of commerce' because of its favorable conditions for agriculture and production." Id at
19-20 n 74. Not only does this parenthetical fail to support their claim that Wilson used the term
"commerce" in the broadest sense, in the passage being cited, Wilson is quite clearly using
"commerce" in its narrow sense to mean "trade or exchange":
The United States have the most extensive prospects of commerce before them.... [T]he
number and value of their productions furnish them with abundant materials to exchange
for the manufactures and refined commodities of Europe and of Asia. The genius of their
governments is favorable to trade, because it is favourable to equality and industry, the only
pillars, on which trade can be supported.
Robert Green McCloskey, ed, The Works of James Wilson 491 (Belknap 1967) (emphases
added).
87 Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 467 (cited in note 67).
88 Id at 492.
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though his fields are blessed with luxuriant abundance. Let the
manufacturer, and let the mechanic, say; they can feel, and tell
their feelings. Go along the wharves of Philadelphia, and observe
the melancholy silence that reigns.... Let the merchants tell you
what is our commerce.69
In the North Carolina debates, "commerce" is mentioned eight-
een times (including two times in proposed amendments). Like else-
where, there is no clear use of it in any sense broader than "trade" or
"exchange," and there are a few clear examples of its use in the nar-
row sense in speeches by William Davie. Davie defined the "general
objects of the union" to be "1st, to protect us against foreign invasion;
2d, to defend us against internal commotions and insurrections; 3d, to
promote the commerce, agriculture, and manufactures, of America."' O
Later, he explained why the regulation of commerce, though distinct
from agriculture and manufacturing, promoted them: "Commerce, sir,
is the nurse of both. The merchant furnishes the planter with such arti-
cles as he cannot manufacture himself, and finds him a market for his
produce. Agriculture cannot flourish if commerce languishes; they are
mutually dependent on each other."" And, Davie also distinguished
between the interests "of agriculture and commerce" and how the
Constitution would protect just claims of "the merchant or farmer.""'
Merchants were those who bought and sold goods; it was they, not
farmers or artisans, who engaged in commerce.
In the reports of the South Carolina convention, the word "com-
merce" is used twenty-six times. Charles Pinckney, who had been a
delegate to the Constitutional Convention and whose use of the term
"commercial interests" Nelson and Pushaw cite as evidence of a broad
meaning of the term "commerce,', equated "the regulation of com-
merce" and mere "privileges with regard to shipping," when he asked,
"[ilf our government is to be founded on equal compact, what in-
ducement can [the Eastern states] possibly have to be united with us,
if we do not grant them some privileges with regard to their ship-
ping?"9" Later, he distinguished between those "people [who] are em-
ployed in cultivating their own lands" and "the rest [who are] in
handicraft and commerce."" And he immediately expanded upon this
89 Id at 524.
90 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 17 (Taylor & Maury 2d ed 1863).
91 Id at 20.
92 Id at 159.
93 See text accompanying note 82.
94 Elliot, ed, 4 Debtites in the Several State Conventions at 284 (cited in note 90).
95 Id at 321.
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by discussing the different "classes" of society comprised of the
"commercial men," the "professional men," those engaged in "the me-
chanical," and the "landed interest-the owners and cultivators of the
soil."' And although he contended that all the other classes should be
subservient to the promotion of the last, he defended commerce from
the criticism that it was "generally cheating."' No other use of the
term connoted a broader meaning of "commerce"; all uses were en-
tirely compatible with the terms "trade" or "exchange."
Virginia wins the prize for the most mentions of the word: sev-
enty-four. Here, as elsewhere, there is not a single instance of "com-
merce" being used unambiguously in the broader sense. To the con-
trary, the most striking evidence is the dominance of a conception of
commerce that is even narrower than "trade" or "exchange"- also
manifested by Pinckney's reference in the South Carolina debates to
"privileges with regard to shipping.' In Virginia, I count at least sev-
enteen references that link "commerce" in some way to ports, ship-
ping, navigation, or the "carrying trades." In other words, on these oc-
casions, the term "commerce" is limited to conveying or transporting
the articles of trade, rather than to the entire act of trading.'
For example, Richard Henry Lee asked those who doubted the
need for the Constitution to "go to our seaports; let him see our com-
merce languishing-not an American bottom to be seen."'" Edmund
Randolph urged members to "[c]ast your eyes to your seaports: see
how commerce languishes."10 ' He observed that "Virginia is in a very
unhappy position with respect to the access of foes by sea, though
happily situated for commerce,"' and that "[a]s it is the spirit of com-
mercial nations to engross as much as possible the carrying trade, this
makes it necessary to defend our commerce."" Like Lee and
Randolph, Francis Corbin also referred to those ports
96 Id at 321-22. This usage also suggests that "commercial" could be used in a narrow as
well as a broad sense.
97 Id at 322 (stating that "there are some kinds of commerce not only fair and valuable, but
such as ought to be encouraged by government").
98 See text accompanying note 94.
99 On the other hand, these usages could be construed as somewhat expanding the scope of
"commerce" to include trade and exchange "as well as," in the words of Justice Thomas, "trans-
porting for these purposes." Lopez, 514 US at 585. Even so expanded, however, the original
meaning of "commerce" would not embrace agriculture, manufacturing, or other productive ac-
tivity. I will discuss this at greater length below in the context of Gibbons v Ogden. See text ac-
companying notes 117-37.
100 Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution 43 (Taylor & Maury 2d ed 1863).
101 Id at 66.
102 Id at 72.
103 Id at 78.
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where we had every reason to see the fleets of all nations, he will
behold but a few trifling little boats; he will every where see
commerce languish; the disconsolate merchant, with his arms
folded, ruminating, in despair, on the wretched ruins of his for-
tune, and deploring the impossibility of retrieving it."M
Future Chief Justice John Marshall asked whether "the Algerines
... and every other predatory or maritime nation, [cannot] pillage our
ships and destroy our commerce, without subjecting themselves to any
inconvenience?"""u Madison asserted that "American vessels, if they
can do it with advantage, may carry on the commerce of the contend-
ing nations.""' William Grayson stated that the riches of all those
"maritime powers of Europe ... come by sea. Commerce and naviga-
tion are the principal sources of their wealth.""' And, echoing Mar-
shall, James Innes asked, "Is it not in the power of any maritime power
to seize our vessels, and destroy our commerce, with impunity?"'
I present all these quotes not to show that the original meaning of
the term "commerce" was limited to shipping. Surely shipping was so
closely identified with commerce because it was at that time the indis-
pensable means for the movement of goods. One could easily extend
this preoccupation with what is now called the "channels and instru-
mentalities" of commerce to railroads, canals, and air transport. But
this close connection reinforces the narrow meaning of commerce and
the purpose for granting Congress the power to regulate it. It also ex-
plains why the earliest cases involving the commerce power had to do
with boats."9
Moreover, these were not the only references to "commerce" in
Virginia. Others of the sort I have canvassed from elsewhere appear
here as well. Edmund Pendleton, for instance, viewed "commerce" as
the means by which "the people may have an opportunity of disposing
of their crops at market, and of procuring such supplies as they may
be in want of-."'' . So synonymous was "commerce" with "trade" that
William Grayson worried that "the whole commerce of the United
States may be exclusively carried on by merchants residing within the
104 Id at 105.
105 Id at 235.
106 Id at 249.
107 Id at 428.
108 Id at 635.
109 See, for example, Gibbons v Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824) (invalidating an exclusive
navigation license granted by the New York state legislature).
110 Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in dze Seveal State Conventions at 295 (cited in note 100).
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seat of government."" He surely could not have been including agri-
culture or manufacturing in his definition of commerce.
Despite the strength and consistency of all this evidence, it is also
true that persons participating in the process of drafting and ratifying
the Constitution frequently used the phrase "trade and commerce. '
This, in the absence of the evidence already presented, might suggest
that these terms were not identical."3 On the other hand, if "com-
merce" is given its broadest connotation as "gainful activity," it would
include "trade" within its meaning, and this phrase would still make
little sense. Instead, it appears that the phrase "trade and commerce"
was something of a couplet like "cease and desist" or, as they say in
Disney World, a "full and complete" stop. The couplet "trade and
commerce" refers to a single activity that could be, and usually was,
called either trade or commerce. Indeed, on two occasions, state con-
vention delegates referred to the power to "regulate trade" rather
than to the power to regulate "commerce.'"
Should there be any doubt about my interpretation of these
statements, go back to the quotes in which there is a context provided
and replace the term "commerce" with the term "gainful activity." All
of these sentences would be rendered incoherent. Nor are these
statements to be dismissed, as Crosskey would have us do,'" because
they occur in partisan debate. Remember, we are not asking what
purposes or intentions are being expressed by these delegates. We are
just asking how they used the term "commerce." So far as these re-
cords permit us to judge, there is no conflict over the meaning of this
term among the otherwise divided participants in these conventions.
From these findings, we can conclude that if anyone in the Consti-
tutional Convention or the state ratification conventions used the
term "commerce" to refer to something more comprehensive than
"trade" or "exchange," they either failed to make explicit that mean-
ing or their comments were not recorded for posterity. The evidence
111 Id at 291.
112 Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787243,263 (Yale 1966).
113 See, for example, Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 36 n 143 (cited in note 11) ("For
example, a broad definition of commerce may be inferred from the Framers' frequent use of the
phrase 'trade and commerce.' ... 'Trade' generally connotes buying and selling goods.... Thus,
'commerce' must have meant something more, or else the couplet 'trade and commerce' would
have been redundant.").
114 See Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 80 (cited in note 67) ("Why
not give Congress power only to regulate trade?"); Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Con.
ventions at 70 (cited in note 90) ("[1It was well known he was for giving power to Congress to
regulate the trade of the United States."). It is possible, though I think implausible given the con-
text, to infer that these two speakers were advocating a power narrower than the power to regu-
late "commerce."
115 See note 28.
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that survives is entirely consistent on this point and confirms the ob-
servation made by Madison late in his life that "[i]f, in citing the Con-
stitution, the word trade was put in the place of commerce, the word
foreign made it synonymous with commerce. Trade and commerce are,
in fact, used indiscriminately, both in books and in conversation." '
B. Judicial Interpretations of Commerce, 1824-1935
Thirty-five years after ratification, in the 1824 case of Gibbons v
Ogden,' John Marshall was called upon to decide whether navigation
was included in the power of Congress to regulate commerce among
the states."" He held that it was. From the perspective of original intent,
this holding is unremarkable. The above sources, and others
unmentioned, "9 make clear the intention to subject shipping and navi-
gation to the regulation of Congress. The interpretive challenge is in
determining exactly how, if at all, navigation is included in the original
meaning of the text. Was it a part of the term "commerce" itself?. Or
was the regulation of navigation incidental to the regulation of com-
merce and therefore authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause?
Then there is always the possibility that the framers used words the
original meaning of which did not accurately express their intentions,
and so they failed to include a power over "navigation" though they
believed they had.
While the sources I have examined do not provide indisputable
answers to these questions, on balance, I think navigation appears to
be included within the meaning of the term "commerce" because of its
intimate connection to the activity of trading. Indeed, as was noted
earlier, the etymology of the term "commerce" is "with" (corn) "mer-
chandise" (merci),'2 a phrase that could accurately be applied to the
"carrying trade," which is how the object of navigation laws was fre-
quently described."' Perhaps the strongest evidence that "commerce"
116 James Madison, Letter to Professor Davis-not sent (1832). in Galliard Hunt, ed, 4 Let-
ters and Other Writings of Janzes Madison 232,233 (J.B. Lippincott 1865).
117 22 US (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
118 Id at 193.
119 Several proposals in the Constitutional Convention to require a supermajority for the
passage of navigation acts make it clear that such acts were thought to be within the powers of
Congress even after the Convention moved to an enumeration of powem See, for example, Max
Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 143 (Yale 1966) (proposal in Ed-
mund Randolph's handwriting to the Committee of Detail); id at 169 (proposal in James Wil-
son's handwriting to Committee of Detail); id at 183 (proposal of Committee of Detail). The
Committee eventually struck the proposal. See id at 400.
120 See 3 Oxford English Dictionary at 552 (cited in note 4) (com--%%ith"; merci-
"merchandise").
121 See, for example, statement of Edmund Randolph quoted above in text accompanying
note 101.
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included navigation is in Article I, Section 9, where Congress is for-
bidden from enacting any "Regulation of Commerce" that gives pref-
erence "to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Ves-
sels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Du-
ties in another. ' '.. Though regulations concerning imports that might
favor one port over another could be considered simply rules govern-
ing trade or exchange, laws governing the movement of vessels, the
enactment of which are partially restricted by this clause, would ap-
pear to be rules concerning navigation or the transportation of articles
of commerce.
In the Philadelphia convention, the extensive debate over
whether "navigation acts" should require a supermajority occurred
explicitly in the context of the power to regulate commerce." For in-
stance, John Rutledge of South Carolina contended that "[i]t did not
follow from a grant of the power to regulate trade, that it would be
abused. At the worst a navigation act could bear hard a little while
only on the S[outhern] States.' 2. The sort of navigation act contem-
plated here was an "act encouraging american bottoms & seamen '
that would incidentally raise the price of freight 6 and so impact ad-
versely exporting interests.
Moreover, there is a hint that the term "commerce" included
navigation in the fact that-like "commerce and trade"-the couplet
"commerce and navigation" appears, by my count, four times during
the ratification debates, twice in Massachusetts and twice in Virginia.'2'
On two of these occasions, "commerce and navigation" was distin-
guished from "various branches of business thereon dependent''l as
well as specifically from agriculture. '"Even expanded to include navi-
gation or transportation, then, commerce is still distinguishable from
122 US Const Art 1, §9, cl 6.
123 See Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 449-53 (cited in note 119).
124 Id at 452 (statement of John Rutledge).
125 Id at 450 (statement of Gouverneur Morris).
126 See id at 451 (statement of James Madison that "the disadvantage to the S[outhern
States from a navigation act, lay chiefly in a temporary rise of freight").
127 See Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 428 (cited in note 100)
(statement of Mr. Grayson of Virginia that "Commerce and navigation are the principal sources
of" the wealth of the maritime nations of Europe); id at 604 (statement of Mr. Mason of Virginia
referring to the opinion expressed by another delegate that "with respect to commerce and navi-
gation,... their regulation, as it now stands, was a sine qua non of the Union, and that without it
the states in Convention would never concur").
128 Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 170 (cited in note 67) (statement
of Mr. Turner of Massachusetts referring to "the deplorable state of our navigation and com-
merce, and various branches of business thereon dependent").
129 Id at 83 (statement of Mr. Bowdoin of Massachusetts referring to "a decrease of our
commerce and navigation, and the duties and revenue arising from them. Hence an insufficient
demand for the produce of our lands, and the consequent discouragement of agriculture.").
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production. If the public at the time of ratification understood the
term "commerce" in the Constitution to include trade, exchange, and
navigation, then that is its original meaning.'
On the other hand, though enactment of "navigation laws" was
widely thought to be within the power of Congress, several statements
suggest that such laws were considered by some at least to be distinct
from regulations of commerce and that the term "navigation" was nei-
ther synonymous with nor subsumed within the term "commerce;'The
Virginia and North Carolina ratification conventions formally pro-
posed that the Constitution be amended to state: "That no navigation
law, or law regulating commerce, shall be passed without the consent
of two thirds of the members present, in both houses.."" This proposed
amendment both assumes that Congress has power to pass navigation
laws and distinguishes such laws from regulations of commerce.
If this and other like evidence is accepted, the admitted power to
pass navigation laws is most accurately conceived as an implied power
that was embraced by the Necessary and Proper Clause. In which case,
the congressional power to regulate transportation is proper only in-
sofar as it is necessary to effectuate the regulation of trade and ex-
change between state and state. Even statements warmly supporting
the enactment of navigation laws suggest that such laws were thought
a necessary means to protect commerce rather than the regulation of
130 Another possibility that would bring navigation under the rubric of -commerce" would
be if "commerce" referred to the trade and exchange of goods andservices.Transportation would
have been one of the very few, if not the only, services of that era that would operate between
state and state. (Postal services might have been another, but Congress was given the power to
enter this business itself by establishing post offices and post roads, US Coast Art 1, § 8. cl 7.)
Services that are produced wholly within a state and then marketed or sold to citizens of other
states might also be considered "commerce ... among the several States" in the same way that
.commerce" includes the selling of goods that are wholly produced within a state. Under this in-
terpretation, though Congress under the Commerce Clause could not properly regulate produc-
tion of such services, like the production of goods, their marketing between states might be. I find
no evidence from the records surrounding the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. how-
ever, to support this meaning. The only specific examples of commerce mentioned concern
goods, in particular the produce of agriculture and manufacturing. Moreover, though the term
"services" appears frequently in the records of the Philadelphia and ratification conventions, it is
almost always in reference to the services of government officials and most often %Yhen discuss-
ing whether such services should be compensated. It is doubtful that, just because they were
compensated, elected officials were commonly thought to be engaged in "commerce." Finally.
and perhaps most persuasively, commerce is repeatedly characterized as being the activity of
merchants who sell, exchange, or barter goods, not those who exchange their services for money.
Both "commerce" and "merchant" have the same root, "mere," chich refers to "merci" or mer-
chandise. See 3 Oxford English Dictionary at 552 (cited in note 4); 9 Oxford English Dictionary
619 (2d ed 1989).
131 Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 660 (cited in note 100) (proposal
of Virginia); Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 245 (cited in note 90) (pro-
posal of North Carolina). See also Elliot, ed,2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 552-53
(cited in note 67) (same amendment disapproved by Maryland convention).
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commerce itself. As Edmund Randoph observed to the Virginia con-
vention:
As it is the spirit of commercial nations to engross as much as
possible the carrying trade, this makes it necessary to defend our
commerce. But how shall we compass this end? England has
arisen to the greatest height, in modern times, by her navigation
act, and other excellent regulations. The same means would pro-
duce the same effects.'
But even this statement could be read as including navigation in the
definition of "commerce."
In Gibbons, Marshall reached his conclusion that navigation was
included in the term "commerce" by relying on the definition of
"commerce" as "intercourse." 3 This was indeed the first definition of
"commerce" offered in Johnson's dictionary. " Johnson, however, de-
fines "intercourse" as "1. Commerce; exchange" and "2. Communica-
tion: followed by with,"35 so it is not at all clear that the meaning of
"intercourse" (especially when not "followed by with") was itself
much broader than trade and exchange. '" Moreover, it is difficult to
imagine that John Marshall, much less the founders, believed that the
term "commerce" in the Constitution embraced noncommercial inter-
course or every form of intercourse. Though the term "intercourse"
appears sixty-three times in the records of the ratification debates
(sometimes with a broader meaning), on each of the six times it is
used in conjunction with "commercial," it is a clear reference to for-
eign trade-though these examples of usage might also be broad
enough to include transport for purposes of trade." And while "inter-
132 Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 78 (cited in note 100).
133 22 US (9 Wheat) at 189-90 ("Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something
more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of na-
tions, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.").
It is worth noting that Chief Justice Marshall did not suggest that navigation was covered be-
cause "commerce" included the trade or exchange of services for money.
134 See text accompanying note 53.
135 Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 53).
136 In light of the secondary meaning of "intercourse" as "communication," we might also
view "commerce" as connoting the somewhat broader meaning of conveying, moving, or trans-
porting something from one place to another-which is accomplished by trade, exchange, naviga-
tion or other means-as distinct from producing the thing to be communicated or transported.
We speak of intellectual intercourse or exchange between people, which is distinct from the pro-
duction of ideas that are then communicated to others, so this somewhat expanded conception of
"commerce" would also preserve the distinction between commerce and agriculture and manu-
facturing. Though this seems a plausible conception of "commerce," apart from the definition in
Johnson, I know of no evidence that supports this as either the prevalent public definition or as
the specific meaning of "commerce" in the Constitution.
137 The term "commercial intercourse" is used six times by four speakers at two conven-
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course" sometimes had a broader meaning, we must never forget that
the Constitution speaks of "commerce" not the "regulation of inter-
course" among the states.
During the Progressive Era, the Supreme Court rejected a broad
conception of commerce as embracing any gainful activity in favor of
the more limited conception of commerce as "trade and exchange"
that is so uniformly reflected in the surviving records of the drafting
and ratification of the Constitution (though it never hesitated to sanc-
tion the power of Congress to regulate the instrumentalities of com-
merce as well as commerce itself). Beginning with the 1895 case of
United States v E.C. Knight CoM and up to the 1936 case of Carter v
Carter Coal Co,o' the Court drew a distinction between "produc-
tion"-such as manufacturing, agriculture, or mining-and "com-
merce" or trade in the things produced. As Chief Justice Fuller wrote
in E.C. Knight: "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part
of it .... The fact that an article is manufactured for export to another
State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce.'t-
And in Carter Coal, Justice Sutherland defined "commerce" as "the
equivalent of the phrase 'intercourse for the purpose of trade.'""'
"Mining" he explained, "brings the subject matter of commerce into
existence. Commerce disposes of it.""' Sutherland's definition harkens
back to Marshall's use of "intercourse" without the unwarranted sug-
gestion that "commerce" embraces every form of intercourse. It also
seems a reasonable definition of the term "commercial intercourse.""'
Using this distinction, the power of Congress to regulate the
economy was sharply restricted. It is no surprise, therefore, that these
decisions were roundly condemned by political and academic propo-
nents of national control of the entire economy." As was to be ex-pected, the Court was criticized for its failure to acknowledge that the
tions. See Elliot, ed, 3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 344 (cited in note 100) (state-
ment of Mr. Monroe of Virginia referring to "a commercial intercourse between the United
States and Spain"); id at 365 (statement of Mr. Corbin of Virginia referring to treaties "being a
regulation of commercial intercourse between different nations"); Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the
Several State Conventions at 119 (cited in note 90) (statement of Mr. Davie of North Carolina re-
ferring to "that commercial intercourse, which, founded on the universal protection of private
property, has, in a measure, made the world one nation"); id at 221 (statement of Mr. Iredell of
North Carolina that: "At the beginning of the late war with Great Britain, the Parliament
thought proper to stop all commercial intercourse with the American provinces.").
M3 156 US 1 (holding that the Sherman Act did not apply to manufacturing trusts).
139 298 US 238, 298 (1936) (ruling that Congress could not regulate the conditions under
which coal is produced before it became an article of commerce).
140 156 US at 12-13.
141 298 US at 298.
142 Id at 304.
143 See note 137.
144 See, for example, Hamilton and Adair, The Poverto Govern at 184-94 (cited in note 15).
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meaning of the Constitution must evolve to meet changing circum-
stance." More surprisingly, however, in light of the historical evidence
presented here that strongly supports its usage, the Court was also
harshly criticized for distorting the original meaning of "commerce."
C. Academics Dispute the Original Meaning of Commerce
In their influential little book, The Power to Govern: The Consti-
tution-Then and Now, published in 1937, Walton Hamilton and
Douglass Adair castigate the Court for imposing its conception of
commerce on the founding generation in defiance of the historical
understanding. "A narrowing of the concept 'commerce,"' they confi-
dently assert, "is at odds with [the Fathers'] contemporary usage."'4'6
But though they pick quotes from the ratification debates reflecting
the demand for stronger national governance, they reveal little of the
evidence of usage also to be found there' or in the notes of the Phila-
delphia convention that I have summarized here. Instead, they rely
primarily on five pages of quotes from a pamphlet by Tench Coxe,
written before the Constitutional Convention, in which he argues for a
sweeping national control over the economy and on Hamilton's 1791
Report on Manufactures, which Coxe is reputed to have helped draft.
Hamilton, it will be recalled, proposed to the Constitutional Con-
vention a plan of government in which the legislature would have the
"power to pass all laws whatsoever ',3 subject only to a negative by the
President. His plan was never considered, and a general grant of pow-
ers to the Congress was rejected by the Convention in favor of an
enumeration. 9 Yet for the rest of his career, Hamilton never wavered
in his efforts on behalf of expanding the power of the national gov-
ernment. Despite this, when he wrote in The Federalist Papers, when
he spoke at the New York ratification convention, and in his opinion
supporting the constitutionality of a national bank, Hamilton used the
word "commerce" in its ordinary narrow sense."O
145 Id at 191-94.
146 Id at 181.
147 But see id at 163 (quoting William Davie's reference to "commerce, agriculture, and
manufactures of America" and his assertion that "Commerce, sir, is the nurse of both" without
commenting on the distinction explicit in Davie's usage).
148 Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 291 (cited in note 112).
149 The Convention rejected language proposed by Gunning Bedford of Delaware that
would have given Congress power "to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Un-
ion, and also in those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation."
Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 131-32 (cited in note 119).
150 See text accompanying notes 61-66,75-78.
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In 1953, this originalist criticism of the Supreme Court's defini-
tion of "commerce" during the Progressive Era was picked up and
greatly expanded by William Crosskey in his massive book, Politics
and the Constitution in the History of the United States" Space pre-
vents me from considering in any detail Crosskey's indictment of the
Progressive Era Court's Commerce Clause doctrines and of anyone
else who disagreed with his conception of national power-especially
James Madison, whom Crosskey repeatedly and without foundation
accused of fabricating his notes of the debates in the Constitutional
Convention."' Like Adair and Douglass, Crosskey studiously avoids
consulting the Philadelphia or state conventions for evidence of usage,
focusing instead on an extensive canvass of pre-revolutionary and pre-
Constitutional sources, such as John Dickinson's 1765 pamphlet, The
Late Regulations Respecting the British Colonies Considered (which
was written at a time when the plenary power of England to govern
the affairs of the colonies was politically difficult to question).'"
I am not disputing here that "commerce" had a broad as well as a
narrow meaning,' or that many before and after the Constitution
strongly favored a national government powerful enough to govern all
"gainful activities." I only dispute, on the basis of the evidence of us-
age presented here and the clash of interests that existed in the coun-
try at the time, that a government of so unlimited a power was
adopted in 1789. And it is striking the degree to which these authors,
whose tone is nothing if not self-righteous towards those who do not
share their views, completely ignore the evidence of usage that the re-
cords of the drafting and ratification process reveal.
151 See note 16.
1-2 See, for example, Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution at 12-13 (cited in note 28)
(Madison's notes "cannot be accepted as a complete and wholly truthful account of the matters
they purport to record" and are "misleading:'). Crosskey's baseless charges are repeated with in-
creasing intensity throughout his study, but, though he promised to substantiate them in a later
work, he never did. His assertions of fabrication have been thoroughly refuted. See Irving Brant,
Mr. Crosskey and Mr. Madison, 54 Colum L Rev 443 (1954) (discussing the lack of foundation
for Crosskey's claims and explaining the absurdity of Crosskey's claim that Madison forged
some of his notes); Donald 0. Dewey, Crosskey Versus Madison: James Madison and the United
States Constitution, 19 Richmond L Rev 435 (1985) (explaining Crosskey's failure to document
his claims and the evidence against the claim of Madison's forgery). It is inadvisable to read
Crosskey without also reading the various reviews of his writings by those knowledgeable
enough to point out his distortions and omissions.
153 Late in life Jefferson recalled his opposition to what he called "the half-way house of
John Dickinson who admitted that England had a right to regulate our commerce, and to lay du-
ties on it for the purposes of regulation, but not of raising revenue." Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1
The Works of Thomas Jefferson 14 (Knickerbocker 1904).
'54 Though I confess that my examination of the evidence of usage during the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution has now made me somewhat skeptical of the contrary claim that
"commerce" (as distinct from "commercial") was used more broadly outside that context.
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Even supposing these critics are right to maintain that "com-
merce" has a meaning as broad as any "gainful activity," however, the
implications of adopting this broader meaning may be less than is
commonly believed. As I shall discuss next, the reach of even a broad
conception of "commerce" is confined by the meaning of the rest of
the clause-that is, by the phrases "among the several States" and "To
regulate.".
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF "AMONG THE
SEVERAL STATES" AND "To REGULATE"
A. The Meaning of "among the several States"
1. Originalist evidence.
a) The Text. Textual analysis of the Commerce Clause strongly
supports a conclusion that the phrase "among the several States" re-
fers to "between people of different states." If this phrase included
commerce between people of the same state that takes place wholly
within a single state, the Commerce Clause would then embrace all
commerce. This interpretation would render the phrase "among the
several States" superfluous. The only reason for adding "among the
several States" (and with foreign nations and Indian tribes) is to ex-
clude some type of commerce from the power of Congress. Therefore,
barring some extrinsic evidence that suggests another plausible
possibility, we can safely conclude that the original meaning of
"among the several States" to those who used and heard this phrase in
the Constitution was commerce that occurred, in Hamilton's words,
"between the States."5 Usage confirms this.
b) The Federalist Papers. In Federalist 42, Madison clarifies that
the purpose of the power to regulate commerce "among the several
States" was to manage trade between people of different states and
facilitate the essential power of regulating trade with foreign nations:
The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the
commerce between its several members is in the number of those
which have been clearly pointed out by experience.... [W]ithout
this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of
155 Moreover, as Nelson and Pushaw discuss at length, Congress has claimed tinder the
Commerce Clause powers far broader than even the most expansive originalist definition ever
proposed. See Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 119-72 (cited in note 11).
156 Federalist 23 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 153 (cited in note 61)
("The principal purposes to be answered by union are these-the common defense of the mem-
bers; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks;
the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of
our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.").
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regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and
ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of
the States which import and export through other States from the
improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these
at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be
foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of im-
port and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction,
with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the
consumers of the former.L"
In no way would such a power reach purely intrastate activities,
whether gainful or not, a point that he emphasized again in Federalist
45:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the fed-
eral government are few and defined. Those which are to remain
in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The for-
mer will be exercised principally on external objects, as war,
peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The pow-
ers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liber-
ties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, im-
provement, and prosperity of the State!"'
Trade "between the States" was a usage that Hamilton would
continue to employ when referring to the Commerce Clause while ad-
vocating, in his opinion to President Washington, that Congress had
the power to incorporate a national bank."'
Both the meaning of the term and the well-known purpose of the
clause were made clear by Hamilton in The Federalist Papers. Under
the Articles of Confederation, the states had "fettered, interrupted
and narrowed"'' the flow of commerce from one state to another by
protective legislation of all sorts. Apart from the need to negotiate
treaties of commerce with other nations, the principal purpose for
adopting a new Constitution was to deprive the states of the power to
interfere with productive exchanges.
M Federalist 42 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 267-65 (cited in note
61) (emphases added).
58 Federalist 45 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 292-93 (cited in note
61). See also id at 293 ("The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power, but that seems to
be an addition which few oppose and from which no apprehensions are entertained.").
159 See note 66 and accompanying text.
160 Federalist 11 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 90 (cited in note 61).
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An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will
advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective
productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home,
but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in
every part will be replenished and will acquire additional motion
and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every
part. Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope from
the diversity in the productions of different States. When the sta-
ple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can
call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the
value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of
foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms
with a large number of materials of a given value than with a
small number of materials of the same value, arising from the
competitions of trade and from the fluctuations of markets.'2
c) The ratification debates. In the New York convention, John
Lansing, who had been a delegate in Philadelphia, praised the Com-
merce Clause and complained about "[t]he languishing situation of
our commerce [that] has also been attributed to the impotence of
Congress."' He then asserted that "all the states, excepting two, had
passed laws to enable Congress to regulate commerce, and that those
two were not indisposed to vest that power."' Lansing was referring
here to the 1784 Act of Congress asking the states for the power to
regulate the trade between different states.' In no way did this pro-
posed act reach commerce or trade that laid solely within any state. '
Finally, the silence from the southern states during ratification
supports this interpretation. It can be asserted with certainty that the
southern states would never have ratified the Constitution if the
power to regulate commerce among the states included the power to
regulate the slave trade within a particular state, which was unques-
tionably and reprehensibly thought to be a form of commerce.'" In my
161 Id at 89-90 (emphasis added).
162 Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 218 (cited in note 67).
163 Id.
164 The Act was ineffectual because most of the states that accepted the recommendation of
Congress made their consent contingent on the unanimous acceptance of all the other states.
When this did not occur, the measure failed. See Report of the States on the Regulation of Coin-
merce, &c., (Friday, March 3, 1786), in Jonathan Elliot, ed, 1 The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 108-11 (Taylor & Maury 2d ed 1863).
165 In fact, the Act appears to have focused entirely on foreign commerce. See id at 106-08.
166 See Scott v Sandford ("Dred Scott"), 60 US 393, 408 (1858) (describing the English
government as "extensively engaged in this commerce"). See also id at 425 (describing slaves as
"subjects of commerce"). See also text accompanying notes 199-202 (discussing the relationship
between the Commerce Clause and the restriction on Congress's power to restrict the slave
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view, asking whether a particular meaning would have been agreed to
by one group or another is not the best indication of the original
meaning of any constitutional provision. At issue should be the public
meaning of the term to which they did agree. Nonetheless, when sup-
ported by other types of evidence of original meaning, the fact that
the slave trade was considered outside the power of Congress to regu-
late commerce "among the several States" bolsters our understanding
of that phrase's public meaning.
d) Other commentators. Although this interpretation of "among
the states" has been contested, most vigorously by William Crosskey,"'
there remains a scholarly and judicial consensus in favor of this as the
original meaning.'6 Consistent with the scheme of federalism that mo-
tivated the granting of a power to regulate commerce among the
states to Congress, trade that occurs wholly within a state was not
commerce "among the states" and, therefore, the regulation of such
commerce was not among the powers of Congress. As professor and
jurist St. George Tucker, one of the earliest scholarly expositors on the
Constitution, explained: "The constitution of the United States does
not authorise congress to regulate, or in any manner to interfere with,
the domestic commerce of any state.""' Tucker offered as an example
of such intrastate commerce, "a vessel wholly employed in that domes-
tic commerce, seems not to be subject to the control of the laws of the
United States."' 70 Tucker allowed that federal law could punish or seize
the vessels of persons who gave "aid or assistance to any fraudulent
commerce, either with foreign parts, or between the states"'" Congress
"may also prescribe, or limit the terms and conditions upon which
vessels may be permitted to trade with foreign parts, or with other
states." But, citing the Tenth Amendment, Tucker concluded that
Congress, under its power to regulate commerce among the states, has
trade with other nations).
167 See Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution at 50-83 (cited in note 28) (noting the dif-
ference between "among" and "between" and asserting that the natural meaning of -among the
several states" included all commerce occurring within any state).
168 See, for example, Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 42-49 (cited in note 11) (discuss-
ing deficiencies in Crosskey's interpretation of "among the States" and concluding: "Although
Crosskey's interpretation is defensible, he did not marshal evidence strong enough to overcome
the presumption that the regulation of commerce, like all federal power, does not extend purely
to internal state affairs.").
169 St. George Tucker, Appendix, in 1 William Blackstone. Commentaries: With Notes of Ref-
erence to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the
Commonwealth of Virginia 250, n * (William Young Birch and Abraham Small 1803).
170 Id. Notice once again the close connection between commerce" and navigation.
171 Id.
172 Id. By referring to a navigation law that limits "the terms and condition-, upon which
vessels may be permitted to trade" Tucker's usage again suggests that navigation is subsumed
within the meaning of trade or commerce. Id.
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"no constitutional right to control the intercourse between any two or
more parts of the same state.'' '
2. The original meaning of "among the states" independently
limits the federal commerce power.
Adopting the narrower meaning of "among the several States"
also reduces the significance of whether "commerce" is interpreted
broadly to include any gainful activity or limited only to trade or ex-
change, For if Congress can only regulate gainful activity that takes
place between people of different states, even the broader definition
of commerce will not encompass much more than trade or exchange.
Thus, supposing the Progressive Era courts were wrong to ex-
clude manufacturing, agriculture, and mining from the category of
"commerce," they were on to something nonetheless. It is hard even to
imagine either a good being manufactured or a crop being grown
"among the states" or "between state and state" unless the factory or
farm physically straddles a state line. Of course, when a company that
manufactures goods or raises crops then sells them or transports them
for gain from one state to another, this aspect of its operation is com-
merce "among the states" under even the narrow definition of com-
merce and is subject to federal regulation. Thus, ordinarily, manufac-
turing, agriculture, and mining-even when "commercial" in the
broadest sense-do not occur between states and therefore are out-
side the regulatory powers of Congress.
I say "ordinarily" because one can imagine industrial, agricultural,
or mining processes which, though otherwise within a state, extend
beyond that state by emitting harmful substances into the air or water
that are carried into neighboring states, like one can imagine a person
standing in Indiana and shooting a bullet into Illinois. Therefore, just
as the regulation of a shipment of products to other states is "proper"
under the Commerce Clause, the "commercial" production of harmful
emissions that cross state lines would be included under the broader
definition of "commerce." Of course, the fact that one aspect of a
business is subject to regulation does not then mean that all its activi-
ties are then appropriately regulated. Only commerce that occurs
"among the several States" is subject to congressional regulation. In
such cases, then, adopting a conception of "commerce" as including all
"gainful activity" would be significant even though manufacturing, ag-
riculture, and mining usually occur within a single state.
173 Id.
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3. Commerce "concerning more than one state" is too broad a
construction of the original meaning of "among the several
States."
While properly rejecting Crosskey's claim that the Commerce
Clause gives Congress the power to regulate any commerce anywhere
in the United States," Nelson and Pushaw unfortunately accept Chief
Justice Marshall's contention that this phrase means "concerns more
states than one"...-the view they correctly say has been accepted by
courts ever since. "6 Thus they contend that under the Commerce
Clause, Congress may regulate not only "commerce that actually
moves 'between' the states" but also commerce "that occurs within a
state and has external effects."'" But they offer no evidence to rebut
the sources that clearly spoke of commerce as "between state and
state." '
The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce that occurs "among the several States," which we have seen
meant "between state and state" or between persons in one state and
persons in another. It does not speak of a power to regulate commerce
that "concerns" more than one state, or even commerce between per-
sons of the same state that somehow "concerns" other states. By the
same token, the Commerce Clause also empowers Congress to regu-
late commerce "with foreign Nations, ... and with the Indian Tribes.'"
It does not empower Congress to regulate commerce that concerns or
affects foreign nations or that concerns or affects Indian tribes.'"
Marshall's vague formulation has improperly permitted the ex-
pansion of the power to regulate commerce beyond that which actu-
ally crosses state lines. The interpretive issue at this juncture is not
whether it might be "necessary and proper" to regulate either non-
commercial actions or entirely intrastate commerce that has a direct
174 Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 43 (cited in note 11) (-[1]f the drafters had in-
tended to cover 'all commerce' they could have said so simply.").
175 Gibbons, 22 US (9 Wheat) at 194-95.
176 See, for example, Lopez, 514 US at 553 (citing Gibbons).
177 Nelson and Pushaw, 85 Iowa L Rev at 42 (cited in note 11).
178 They rely on a number of secondary sources-including, curiously Crosskey, whose in-
terpretation they otherwise reject-who argues that "among" had a broader meaning. See id.
This evidence is insufficient, however, to establish that the appearance of "among" in the Com-
merce Clause refers to something other than commerce that takes place "between state and
state," and Nelson and Pushaw offer no new evidence that bears directly on this question.
179 US Const Art 1, § 8, cl 3.
180 This is not to deny Richard Epstein's contention that all commerce takes place in one
state or another. See Epstein, 73 Va L Rev at 1403 (cited in note 19). Rather, it is to insist that
Congress has power only to regulate those activities that are part of a transaction between per-
sons of different states (or with foreign nations or Indian tribes), not a transaction between per-
sons of the same state.
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impact upon commerce that does cross state lines. The issue here is
whether Congress's power under the Commerce Clause extends to
commerce that occurs wholly within one state but still can be said to
"concern" more states than one. The original meaning of "among the
several States" provides no warrant for this extension of power.
Determining whether a particular regulation of activity that is not
"commerce ... among the several States" -that is, trade between state
and state-is constitutional requires an assessment not only of the
Commerce Clause but of the Necessary and Proper Clause as well.
This is not the place to discuss fully the original meaning of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.'' Suffice it to say that the requirement of "ne-
cessity" requires a showing, not merely an assertion, of means-end fit,
while "propriety" requires a showing that the exercise of power lies
properly within the jurisdiction of Congress. As summarized by Gary
Lawson and Patricia Granger:
In view of the limited character of the national government un-
der the Constitution, Congress's choice of means to execute fed-
eral powers would be constrained in at least three ways: first, an
executory law would have to conform to the "proper" allocation
of authority within the federal government; second, such a law
would have to be within the "proper" scope of the federal gov-
ernment's limited jurisdiction with respect to the retained pre-
rogatives of the states; and third, the law would have to be within
the "proper" scope of the federal government's limited jurisdic-
tion with respect to the people's retained rights. In other words,
181 I began this inquiry in Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L Rev 745
(1997) (distinguishing the Madisonian from Marshallian conceptions of necessity). Since that ar-
ticle was published I have come to think that the two sides of this controversy were not as far
apart as is commonly believed. On one side, Madison rejected a conception of necessity as "in-
dispensably necessary" as too confining. See Elliot, ed, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions
at 417 (cited in note 90) (statement of Rep. Madison to House of Representatives, February 2,
1791) (urging a "liberal construction" since "very few acts of the legislature could be proved es-
sentially necessary to the absolute existence of government"). While Hamilton, in turn, argued
that some degree of means-end fit must be shown. See Hamilton, Opinion on Bank at 104 (cited
in note 66) ("The relation between the measure and the end; between the nature of the mean em-
ployed towards the execution of a power and the object of that power must be the criterion of
constitutionality not the more or less of necessity or utility."). Even John Marshall's opinion in
McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), however, does not necessarily give Con-
gress a blank check to assess the necessity and propriety of its own acts. See David . Currie, The
Constitution in the Supreme Court: State and Congressional Powers, 1801-35,49 U Chi L Rev 931,
932 (1982) ("In light of earlier statements in [Marshall's] opinion, the implication seems unmis-
takable: incidental authority must not be so broadly construed as to subvert the basic principle
that Congress has limited powers."). What most divided them was a combination of (a) the de-
gree of means-end fit that must be shown, (b) whether the bank met the requisite degree of fit,
and (c) the degree of judicial deference that was appropriate. I will present this evidence at
greater length in The Presumption of Liberty: Natural Rights and the Constitution.
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... executory laws must be consistent with principles of separa-
tion of powers, principles of federalism, and individual rights.'2
My objective in this Article is not to define precisely the inciden-
tal powers of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause to
reach activity that is not commerce, or is commerce that is not be-
tween state and state. My goal is only to define as precisely as the evi-
dence permits the original meaning of "commerce," "among the sev-
eral States," and "To regulate" in the face of judicial and academic dis-
agreement about the meaning of these terms. For knowing the scope
of these terms is the first essential step towards determining if some
other power is really incidental to and for the purpose of the regula-
tion of commerce among the states.
B. The Meaning of "To regulate"
1. The power to regulate does not generally include the power
to prohibit.
Samuel Johnson defines "to regulate" as "1. To adjust by rule or
method.... 2. To direct."' In other words, the term "to regulate"
means "to make regular." The power to regulate is, in essence, the
power to say, "if you want to do something, here is how you must do
it." For example, the making of contracts and wills are "regulated" by
the law of contracts and estates. To make an enforceable agreement
for a sale of goods over five hundred dollars requires that the agree-
ment be in writing. To make a will requires a specified number of wit-
nesses to one's signature. These requirements regulate-or "make
regular"-the making of contracts and wills by subjecting them to a
rule or method.The power to regulate the making of contracts or wills
is not the power to prohibit such activity, even though contracts or
wills that do not conform to the regulation are necessarily unenforce-
able. A pure regulation of commerce, then, is a set of rules that tells
people, "If you want to trade or exchange with others, here is how you
must go about it."
In contrast, Johnson defines "to prohibit" as "1. To forbid; to in-
terdict by authority.... 2.To debar; to hinder."4 Forbidding, interdict-
ing, and hindering are not the same thing as regulating, or "making
regular," or adjusting by rule or method. It does not tell you how to do
182 Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power.A Jurisdic-
tional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L J 267,297 (1993) (arguing that ajurisdic-
tional approach to the Sweeping Clause best fits the text and the understanding of early legal
scholars).
183 Johnson, 2 A Dictionary of the English Language (cited in note 54).
184 Id.
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something, but instead tells you that you may not do it at all. And in
Johnson's dictionary, neither "to regulate" nor "to prohibit" is defined
in terms of the other; each seems quite distinct. Indeed, both terms
appear in the Constitution and the context in which they are used
suggests that their meanings sharply differ.
Apart from the Commerce Clause, the terms "regulate" or "regu-
lation" appear seven other times in the body of the Constitution and
three times in the amendments proposed by Congress to the states,
though only once in the Bill of Rights as ratified. The term "prohibit"
is used once in the body of the Constitution and twice in the Bill of
Rights. Article I, Section 4 gives Congress the power to "alter such
Regulations""' on the time, place, and manner of elections prescribed
by state legislatures. Clearly, the power to regulate or facilitate elec-
tions is not the power to prohibit them. Article I, Section 8 gives Con-
gress the power "[t]o... regulate the Value""' of money, not to prohibit
the use of money or to "regulate" its value to zero.
In two places the Constitution makes an explicit distinction be-
tween prohibition and regulation. Article III, Section 2 gives the Su-
preme Court appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, "with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.""7 By distinguishing "exceptions" from "regulations," the Con-
stitution distinguished Congress's power to regulate or subject to rule
the Court's appellate jurisdiction and its power to prohibit the Court
from exercising its jurisdiction by making "exceptions" thereto. If the
power to make regulations included the power to prohibit that which
is regulated, there would have been no need to give explicit power to
Congress to make "exceptions" to appellate jurisdiction.
That the Constitution does not adopt the broader meaning of
regulation as "to govern" is also reflected in Article I, Section 8, which
gives Congress the power "[tjo make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces."''. Here, the term "govern-
ment" is coupled with "regulation" in a manner that makes clear that
Congress has complete power to command or govern the army and
navy, not merely the power to regulate them.
Less clear, but still consistent with the distinction between "To
regulate" and "to govern," is Congress's power in Article IV, Section 3
"to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States".'..
185 US Const Art 1, § 4, cl 1.
186 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 5 (emphasis added).
187 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 2.
188 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 14.
189 US Const Art IV, § 3, cl 12.
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Congress clearly has the power to govern the territories, and the term
"rules and regulations" suggests strongly that its powers are broader
than merely regulatory, though it includes the power to make "regula-
tions" as well as other needful "rules."
That the Constitution uses the term "to regulate" in this sense is
made plain by the Second Amendment, the first portion of which
reads, "A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State."' A "well-regulated" militia is not a prohibited militia but
one that is well drilled."' Even those who read the Second Amend-
ment as a "collective" rather than an individual right on the basis of
this preface concede-indeed their theory requires them to insist-
that the power to regulate the militia that the Constitution elsewhere
confers upon Congress9' does not include the power to forbid or pro-
hibit the militia. By their interpretation, the sole purpose of the Sec-
ond Amendment was to protect the continued existence of the state
militias.", By the same token, the power of Congress to "well-regulate"
commerce among the states does not include the power to forbid or
prohibit commerce.", James Madison described a direct parallel be-
tween the regulation of the militia and the regulation of commerce
when he asked:
How can the trade between the different States be duly regulated
without some knowledge of their relative situations in these and
other points? ... How can uniform regulations for the militia be
duly provided without a similar knowledge of some internal cir-
190 US Const Amend II.
191 This is implicit in Hamilton's observation that:
To oblige the great body of the yeomanry and of the other classes of the citizens to be un-
der arms for the purpose of going through military exercises and evolutions, as often as
might be necessary to acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the
character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to the people and a serious
public inconvenience and loss.
Federalist 29 (Hamilton), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 184 (cited in note 61).
192 See US Const Art I, § 8, cl 16 (referring to the power of Congress: To provide for orga-
nizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be em-
ployed in the Service of the United States."). Even here the distinction between regulation and
governance is implicit. Congress has the general power to regulate the militia by "organizing.
arming, and disciplining" it (but not the power to abolish it), and has the stronger power"to gov-
ern" only that "part" of the militia that is in actual service.
193 See, for example, Keith A. Ehrman and Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in
the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U Dayton L Rev 5,57 (1959) (ar-
guing that the framers' intent behind the Second Amendment was to protect independent state
militias).
194 The Frst Amendment originally proposed by Congress that was never ratified, though
less clear, is entirely consistent with the meaning of regulate for which I am contending. It directs
that the number of representatives "shall be so regulated by Congress" that the number of Rep-
resentatives shall not fall below a specified proportion of the population.
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cumstances by which the States are distinguished from each
other? These are the principal objects of federal legislation and
suggest most forcibly the extensive information which the repre-
sentatives ought to acquire."
How do the debates in the state ratification debates bear out this
distinction between the power "to regulate" and the power "to pro-
hibit"? The term "regulate" appears fifty-five times in all the records
we have of the deliberations in the states.'% In every case where the
context makes the meaning clear, the term connotes "subject to a
rule" or "make regular" in the sense that "if you want to do something,
here is how you should do it." As with the word "commerce," the term
"regulate" is used with stunning uniformity-so much so that it would
be tedious to reproduce the quotes here. And it is unnecessary be-
cause the term appears overwhelmingly in the context of regulatory
powers that, as we observed in the intratextual discussion above, could
not plausibly have included the power to prohibit such activities.
These are references to the powers to regulate elections (18), jury tri-
als (6), courts (5), militias (2), taxes (1), treaties (1), and the delibera-
tions of the Senate (1).'97 In the rest, the term "regulate" is used in its
ordinary sense, in some context other than the Constitution of the newgovernment.""
195 Federalist 53 (Madison), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 333 (cited in note 61).
Notice here the reference to the Commerce Clause as regulating "trade between the different
States." In Federalist 4, John Jay drew a like parallel between the power of Congress over the mi-
litia and commerce when he referred to "our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly or-
ganized and disciplined." Federalist 4 (Jay), in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 49 (cited in
note 61).
196 Massachusetts (13), Connecticut (1), New York (9), Pennsylvania (2), Virginia (16),
North Carolina (11), and South Carolina (3).
197 I have, of course, omitted from this list discussions of the power to regulate commerce
(5), trade (2), or contracts (1) since it is the scope of this power that is at issue here. Nevertheless
the two references to regulating "trade" support the narrow meaning of "commerce."
198 See, for example, Elliot, ed, 2 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 16 (cited in
note 67) ("[W]e ought to consult the sentiments of wise men, who have written on the subject of
government, and thereby regulate our decision on this business."); id at 252 ("[T]he general
sense of the people will regulate the conduct of their representatives."); id at 301 ("[Tjhere
should be, in every republic, some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the intem-
perate passions, and regulate the fluctuations, of a popular assembly."); id at 384 (referring to
"making laws to regulate the height of fences and the repairing of roads"); Elliot, ed, 3 Debates
in the Several State Conventions at 137 (cited in note 100) ("There are certain maxims by which
every wise and enlightened people will regulate their conduct."); id at 227 ("We may now regu-
late and frame a plan that will enable us to repel attacks.").
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2. The power "to regulate" might sometimes include the power
"to prohibit."
There is, however, one nov-obsolete passage of the Constitution
that argues for a broader original meaning of the term "To regulate."
Article I, Section 9, stipulates that the "Migration or Importation of
such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year"
'
,)
1808. This suggests that, but for this Section, Congress would have the
power to prohibit the slave trade with foreign nations as part of either
its taxing power or its power to regulate commerce.
Edmund Randolph discussed this clause as part of his argument
to the Virginia ratification convention that the exceptions to Congres-
sional powers that appeared in the Constitution in no way implied a
power to legislate generally. To rebut the contrary suggestion,
Randolph endeavored to show how every exception modified an
enumerated power: "To what power in the general government is the
exception made respecting the importation of negroes? Not from a
general power, but from a particular power expressly enumerated.
This is an exception from the power given them of regulating com-
merce."' ° In this way, Randolph explicitly linked the power to prohibit
the slave trade to the commerce power. Randolph's recollection is
borne out by the draft sketch of a constitution he had submitted dur-
ing the Convention to the Committee of Detail. In his sketch, the pro-
hibition is listed explicitly as the second exception to the power to
regulate commerce."
Ironically, just as the South's commitment to slavery undermines
the inference that Congress had the power to regulate intrastate trade,
thereby supporting the narrow meaning of "among the states," here
the slavery issue provides evidence that Congress's power "To regu-
late" commerce with foreign nations was broad enough to include the
power to prohibit at least some kinds of commerce. But this is not
the only reason to believe that the power to regulate commerce in-
cluded the power to prohibit at least some types of trading. Perhaps
199 US ConstArt 1, §9,cl 1.
200 Elliot, ed,3 Debates in the Several State Conventions at 464 (cited in note 100).
201 See James H. Hutson, ed, Supplement to Ma Farrand's The Records of the Federal Con-
vention of1787 187 (Yale 1987).
2P The Supreme Court later held that although the foreign slave trade was subject to con-
gressional legislation, see Groves v Slaughter, 40 US 449 (1841), the federal government clearly
lacked the power to regulate the domestic slave trade. See id at 508 (Taney concurring) ("[Tihe
power over this subject is exclusively with the several states"); id at 514 (Baldwin concurring)
(asserting that the regulation of slavery "depended on the law of each state," and that "no power
[over this] is granted of the Constitution to Congress").
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the most important reason to grant Congress the power to regulate
commerce was not the power to eliminate trade barriers among the
several states (which Madison referred to as a "supplemental provi-
sion" ,), but the power to place restrictions on foreign access to
American markets to facilitate the opening of European trade to
Americans as well as to promote domestic production. Thus, it was en-
visioned that the power to regulate trade with foreign nations in-
cluded the power to prohibit certain types of trade by means of, for
example, tariffs.2
However, even if it is conceded that the original meaning of "To
regulate" included a power to restrict foreign commerce in negotiating
treaties to lower foreign barriers to American goods as well as to pro-
tect some domestic markets from foreign competition, this aspect of
the power to regulate does not necessarily extend to domestic com-
merce. The Constitution expressly bars Congress from using any
"Regulation of Commerce" to favor the ports of one state over those
of another,7 and it mandates that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States."0' These provisions
deny Congress the same degree of regulatory power over domestic
commerce that it has over commerce with foreign nations. And they
provide circumstantial textual evidence that the domestic portion of
the Commerce Clause lacked the prohibitory aspect that was included
in the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and was in-
stead intended to eliminate and prevent any state-imposed barriers to
trade between the states. 7
203 Federalist 42 (Madison) in Rossiter, ed, The Federalist Papers at 267-68 (cited in note
61). For the passage in which this reference appears, see text accompanying note 157.
204 Another means to promote American trade by requiring that trade be carried in Ameri-
can ships could be viewed as a regulation rather than a prohibition, as it states, "if you want to
trade with the U.S., here is how you must do it."
205 US Const Art I, § 9, cl 6. While this power applies to both domestic and foreign com-
merce, it does not prevent the Congress from enacting "regulations of commerce" that give pref-
erence to trade with one foreign nation over that with another.
206 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 1. To the extent that duties and imposts are proper means for
regulating commerce with foreign nations (as opposed to raising revenues) by favoring one na-
tion over another or one type of good over another, this clause operates to prohibit Congress
from using its power to regulate commerce among the states to impose duties or imposts to favor
one state over another.
207 When the known purposes of the founders suggest that a single use of a word has two
different meanings depending on the noun to which it refers, is this consistent with the objective
approach to original meaning that was described above? Yes. In contracts, objective ambiguity
can occur when a word has more than one reasonable or public meaning. For example, each
party can use the name "Peerless" to refer to one of two different ships bearing the same name.
See Raffles v Wichelhaus, 2 H & C 906, 159 Eng Rep 375 (Ex 1864). If the name "Peerless" rea-
sonably describes both ships, then the parties' use of the term "Peerless" is ambiguous from an
objective standpoint. Due to the objective ambiguity, though they used the same word, as Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. put it, "[each party] said a different thing." Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The
[68:101
HeinOnline -- 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 144 2001
The Original Meaning of the Connerce Clause
This is precisely the distinction offered by James Madison. In cor-
respondence with Joseph Carrington Cabell long after ratification,"
Madison contended that the "meaning of the power to regulate com-
merce is to be sought in the general use of the phrase; in other words,
in the objects generally understood to be embraced by the power
when it was inserted in the Constitution."- And, as is well known, the
purposes of granting Congress the power to regulate trade "with for-
eign nations" differed markedly from the purpose for regulating trade
"among the several States." Given the need for a broader power over
the former, Madison said he "always foresaw"' ' difficulty properly in-
terpreting the latter.
Being in the same terms with the power over foreign commerce,
the same extent, if taken literally, would belong to it. Yet it is very
certain that it grew out of the abuse of the power by the import-
ing States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a
negative and preventive provision against injustice among the
States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the posi-
tive purposes of the General Government, in which alone, how-
ever, the remedial power could be lodged. And it will be safer to
leave the power with this key to it, than to extend to it all the
qualities and incidental means belonging to the power over for-
eign commerce, as is unavoidable.n'
In other words, the use of tariffs and other forms of "prohibitory
regulation[s],"m-the term itself a concession to the normal meaning
of "regulation"-while necessary to effectuate the purposes of the
Common Law 242 (M. Howe, ed) (Belknap 1967). Likevis, a group of persons can use a single
ambiguous verb to signify objectively two different activities depending on the noun to which it
refers. When two people attach different meanings to the same word in a contract, we consider
this to be a "misunderstanding" and assent can fail. But when a group of people agrees to use
one word to connote, depending on the circumstances, two different meanings, they have objec-
tively manifested their intentions, albeit in an awkward manner that makes the objective mean-
ing of their words sometimes difficult to discern.
2M Cabell was a post-revolutionary intellectual and cofounder, with Thomas Jefferson. of
the University of Virginia.
209 James Madison, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (March 22,1827). in Galliard Hunt, ed,3 Let-
ters and Other Writings of James Madison 571 (J.B. Lippincott 1865)
210 James Madison, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (February 13,1829), in Galliard Hunt. ed, 4
Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 14 (J.B. Lippincott 1865).
211 Id at 15. Madison's account would also explain why "[nlo serious and sustained effort...
was ever made to employ against the domestic slave trade the power of Congress to regulate in-
terstate commerce." Arthur Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis. 69 Am
Hist Rev 327,342 (1964). According to Bestor, "[p]ublic opinion seems to have accepted as vir-
tually axiomatic the constitutional principle" that Congress had no power to prohibit or obstruct
the trade in slaves between the slaveholding states. Id.
212 James Madison, Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (March 22,1827), in Hunt, ed, 3 Letters and
Other Writings of James Madison at 572 (cited in note 209).
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power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, would fly in the
face of the purpose for regulating commerce among the states." The
former power was supposed to protect and promote domestic eco-
nomic activities by restricting imports, as well as to levy the types of
restrictions that would induce foreign nations to open their markets to
American shipping and goods. By contrast, within the United States,
the purpose of the power was the reverse: to eliminate trade barriers
at the state level that were thought entirely proper at the national
level. And this last purpose is manifested in the textual prohibitions of
preferential regulations of commerce and nonuniform duties or im-
posts-textual provisions that support an inference that the original
meaning of "To regulate" varied with the subject of the regulation.
CONCLUSION
The most persuasive evidence of original meaning-statements
made during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution as well as
dictionary definitions and The Federalist Papers-strongly supports
Justice Thomas's and the Progressive Era Supreme Court's narrow in-
terpretation of Congress's power "To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
'34
"Commerce" means the trade or exchange of goods (including the
means of transporting them); "among the several States" means be-
tween persons of one state and another; and the term "To regulate"
means "to make regular"-that is, to specify how an activity may be
transacted-when applied to domestic commerce, but also includes
the power to make "prohibitory regulations" when applied to foreign
trade. In sum, Congress has power to specify rules to govern the man-
ner by which people may exchange or trade goods from one state to
another, to remove obstructions to domestic trade erected by states,
and to both regulate and restrict the flow of goods to and from other
nations (and the Indian tribes) for the purpose of promoting the do-
mestic economy and foreign trade.
To determine the constitutionality of any particular legislation
and evaluate judicial applications of the Commerce Clause, however,
213 It may be argued that admitting evidence of such purposes is a reversion to original in-
tent rather than original meaning. I discuss this evidence, however, simply to put in perspective
the express textual restriction on Congress's power to restrict the slave trade with foreign na-
tions, see US Const Art I, § 9, and its possible effect on the meaning of "to regulate" in the
Commerce Clause. But the same evidence of purpose that helps explain this broadening of the
power "to regulate" also includes evidence that this broadening was limited to foreign trade. This
is simply an example of how evidence of publicly known purposes helps to shape the original
public meaning of words and phrases.
214 US Const Art I, §8, cl 3.
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we must also consider the meaning of the Necessary and Proper
Clause. If the original meaning of "proper" in this clause was, as Gary
Lawson and Patricia Granger have shown, ' that the end or purpose
of a law must be within the jurisdiction of Congress to enact, a narrow
conception of the Commerce Clause limits Congress to the end or
purpose of making regular the trade between the states. Legislation
that is actually for a different purpose cannot be upheld as "proper."
As Chief Justice John Marshall stated in McCulloch v Maryland,'
"should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws
for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government, it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that such an
act was not the law of the land."27
And, as I have argued elsewhere," if the Necessary and Proper
Clause requires an assessment of "necessity" in which legislation is
scrutinized to determine if there is adequate fit between means and
ends, then the Congress must show, at minimum, it has chosen means
that actually conduce to an enumerated end. Even John Marshall, who
construed the degree of necessity required by the clause more loosely
than I think is warranted, allowed that the means chosen must be
"plainly adapted" to a "legitimate" end that is "within the scope of the
constitution."2' 9 In which case, the only "appropriate means"' are those
that are actually incidental to making regular trade between the states.
This all assumes, of course, that a court is bound by the original
meaning of the Commerce Clause. I have argued elsewhere why it
should be, so long as it professes a commitment to a written constitu-
tion. ' Moreover in recent years there has been a marked movement
on the part of constitutional theorists in the direction of original
meaning, at least to provide the starting point of constitutional analy-
sistm-in which case, the content of the starting point surely matters.
But this is an argument for another place. What has been established
here is that those who have claimed that the original meaning of the
Commerce Clause was narrow are right and their critics are wrong.
215 See Lawson and Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power, 43 Duke LJ 267 (cited
in note 182).
216 17 US (4 Wheat) 316,316 (1819).
217 Id at 423.
218 See Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L Rev at 745 (cited in note 181).
219 17 US (4 Wheat) at 421 ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be vithin the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
See my discussion of Marshall's and Hamilton's view of "necessity" in note 181.
220 17 US (4 Wheat) at 421.
221 See Barnett, 45 Loyola L Rev at 629-43 (cited in note 30) (discussing -writtenness" and
the relevance of original meaning to constitutional legitimacy).
222 See id at 611-20 (describing the pervasiveness of originalism in constitutional scholarship).
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